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ARTICLES AND RESPONSES




C OURTS regulate lawyers by making and enforcing much of the
law governing lawyers' professional conduct. As lawmakers,
courts promulgate rules of conduct, or disciplinary rules, such as those
contained in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct' and the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility,2 and adopt additional legal stan-
dards relating to lawyers' conduct in ad hoc or common-law fashion in
the course of adjudication. As law-enforcers, courts establish discipli-
nary mechanisms to which allegations of lawyer misconduct may be
referred. Courts also sanction lawyers for wrongdoing that arises in
the course of litigation.3
In litigation, disputes over lawyers' professional conduct most fre-
quently involve conflicts of interest,4 a subject addressed extensively
by disciplinary rules.5 Although various purposes have been ascribed
to them, the "conflict rules"' are best understood as rules of "risk
avoidance."7 They address situations in which there is a risk that a
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Director, Stein Center for Eth-
ics and Public Interest Law;, A.B. Princeton University, 1978; J.D. Columbia Univer-
sity, 1981.
1. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1996) [hereinafter Model Rules].
2. Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1980) [hereinafter Model Code].
3. Another judicial role, which grows out of the first two, is as law-interpreter.
Courts interpret disciplinary rules and other law governing lawyers in the course of
reviewing disciplinary decisions or resolving issues of professional conduct that arise
in litigation. The courts' role as interpreters of conflict-of-interest law is addressed
only tangentially in this Article.
4. A recent study by Professor Daniel Coquillette determined that out of 443
reported federal decisions involving attorney conduct over a five-year period, 46%
involved conflict-of-interest rules and an additional 10% involved the attorney-wit-
ness disqualification rules, which many regard as conflict-of-interest rules. See Daniel
R. Coquillette, Study of Recent Federal Cases (1990-1995) Involving Rules of Attor-
ney Conduct 3-4 (Dec. 1, 1995) (distributed at the Special Study Conference of Fed-
eral Rules Governing Attorney Conduct in Los Angeles, California, on January 9-10,
1996) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). For an extensive review of the law
governing lawyers' conflicts of interest, see Developments in the Law: Conflicts of
Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 Harv. L Rev. 1244 (1981).
5. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rules 1.7 - 1.12; Model Code, supra note 2, DR
5-101 - DR 5-107.
6. By "conflict rules," this Article means disciplinary provisions addressing con-
flicts of interest. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
7. See Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 823, 826 (1992).
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lawyer will not adequately carry out obligations to a present or former
client because of competing obligations to another present or former
client or because of the lawyer's own competing interests. Before ac-
cepting or continuing the representation in such situations, the lawyer
must obtain the informed consent of the clients whose interests are
put at risk; where the risk is unreasonably high, the lawyer must re-
frain from accepting or continuing the representation.
Like other rules of professional conduct, the conflict rules are
designed to be enforced primarily by disciplinary agencies, 8 to the ex-
tent they are not self-enforced. As David Wilkins has shown, how-
ever, disciplinary bodies do not comprehensively police litigators'
conduct.9 Particularly in litigation involving corporate clients, viola-
tions of the conflict rules are unlikely to be called to the disciplinary
authorities' attention and, consequently, unlikely to be punished.10
In overseeing litigation, courts have the opportunity to compensate
for the inadequacy of the disciplinary process. They frequently seek
to do so by disqualifying a lawyer as punishment for violating an ap-
plicable conflict rule. Unlike the personal sanctions imposed in disci-
plinary proceedings, disqualification punishes lawyers indirectly.
Nonetheless, disqualification of counsel may serve effectively as an al-
ternative enforcement mechanism-in David Wilkins's words, it
serves as an "institutional control" as distinguished from a "discipli-
nary control.""
In some cases, independently of any interest in complementing the
disciplinary process, courts would disqualify the lawyer in order to
protect a present or former client from the risks posed by the lawyer's
conflict of interest. Thus, disqualification may serve a remedial func-
tion. In other cases, however, disqualification seems unnecessary or
inappropriate as a remedy, because the risks posed by the lawyer's
conflict of interest are slight or because those risks seem to be accept-
able ones in light of the countervailing harms that disqualification
would cause both to the court and to the litigant who would be de-
prived of the chosen lawyer's services. In such cases, disqualification
serves primarily, if not exclusively, as a sanction. Given that the bur-
den of disqualification falls largely on the client, not the lawyer, the
question arises whether it is an appropriate sanction in light of the
alternatives available to courts seeking to oversee litigators' conduct.
This Article argues that disqualification is not an appropriate sanc-
tion and should therefore be reserved for cases in which it is needed
8. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Preamble.
9. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 801, 829
(1992); see Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators
Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69, 91 (1995); Developments
in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
1547, 1597-605 (1994).
10. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 827-28.
11. Id at 805-09.
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as a remedy.'2 When a litigant's lawyer violates the standard of con-
duct established by an applicable conflict rule, the court should sanc-
tion the lawyer personally, but should remove the lawyer from the
case only if found necessary to avert harm to a former or present cli-
ent. The decision concerning disqualification should not be predi-
cated on the conflict rules that apply to a lawyer's conduct in
accepting a new representation and, where violated, serve as the basis
of possible disciplinary sanctions. Instead, courts should develop a
conflict-of-interest jurisprudence that is less restrictive and less cate-
gorical than the conflict rules. Further, the ad hoc judicial resolution
of disqualification motions should serve as a model for addressing
conflicts of interest in other procedural contexts, including in rulings
on requests for declaratory relief.
By way of background, part I first identifies some points of conten-
tion regarding the appropriate judicial role in making and enforcing
the law governing lawyers' conflicts of interest. It then underscores
some contributions that David Wilkins's article makes to the discus-
sion of these issues of institutional choice. Finally, part I describes a
judicial decision that will then be used to illustrate points made in the
remainder of the Article.
Part II addresses the courts' role in enforcing the standards of con-
duct governing lawyers' conflicts of interest. It considers whether
courts should disqualify lawyers as a sanction for violating the conflict
rules. It explores two arguments against doing so-first, that discipli-
nary proceedings are more appropriate than judicial proceedings as a
forum for sanctioning litigators who violate the conflict rules, and, sec-
ond, that disqualification is an inappropriate sanction, because its bur-
dens fall principally on a presumptively innocent client and on the
court, not on the lawyer. The Article suggests that the second argu-
ment is persuasive, particularly because courts, if they chose to do so,
could impose personal sanctions as an effective alternative. It there-
fore concludes that disqualification should be employed as a remedy
only.
Part III, addressing the courts' role as lawmakers, considers what
law should determine whether disqualification is a necessary remedy
for a litigator's conflict of interest. It argues that disqualification
should not be a per se remedy for a violation of a conflict rule and
that, on the contrary, the court's determination should not be based
on the conflict rules at all. The conflict rules, which are designed to
apply to a lawyer's decision at the outset of the representation, would
be overly restrictive if applied by courts in the disqualification setting
after the representation is under way. Rather than applying an alter-
native set of rules, courts should apply an open-textured standard that
12. In referring to a disqualification as a "remedy," this Article means a device to
prevent future harm, as distinguished from a punishment.
1996]
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permits an ad hoc weighing of the likely harms to be caused by the
conflict of interest and the countervailing harms that disqualification
would engender. Courts should also employ this standard when ruling
on the appropriateness of representation outside the disqualification
setting.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Questions of Institutional Role
Two questions of institutional role underlie discussions of conflicts
of interest in litigation. The first is what role courts should play in
enforcing the standards governing litigators' conduct with respect to
conflicts of interest. The second is what role courts should play in
establishing those standards. As discussed below, both questions have
defied uniform judicial resolution.
1. The Judiciary's Role in Enforcing Conflict Standards
The appropriate judicial role in enforcing conflict-of-interest stan-
dards turns on the extent to which courts should disqualify lawyers as
a sanction for violating the standards, rather than exclusively as a rem-
edy for harms that would be imposed on the trial process or on clients
if the lawyer were to continue in the representation. Courts substan-
tially disagree about this.13
Some courts have explicitly refused to serve a disciplinary function.
For example, the Second Circuit issued a series of influential opinions
more than fifteen years ago, at the time when district court rulings on
disqualification motions were still immediately appealable. 14 React-
ing against what it perceived to be the increasing misuse of disqualifi-
cation motions for tactical reasons, the court ruled that
disqualification was proper only when a litigator's conflict of interest
13. See Linda A. Wimslow, Note, Federal Courts and Attorney Disqualification Mo-
tions: A Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 863 (1987); cf.
Sanders v. Rosenberg, 896 P.2d 491, 493 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (noting conflicting
approaches).
14. In a succession of decisions in the 1980s, the Supreme Court held that deci-
sions on disqualification motions are not immediately appealable. See, e.g., Richard-
son-Merrell Inc. v. Koler, 472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) (holding that a disqualification
order in a civil case was not immediately appealable); Flanagan v. United States, 465
U.S. 259, 260 (1984) (holding that a disqualification order in a criminal case was not
immediately appealable); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 370
(1981) (vacating judgment of Court of Appeals because orders denying motions to
disqualify counsel are not immediately appealable). Underlying these decisions is a
concept of disqualification as a remedy for harms that may or may not later occur,
rather than as a sanction. If disqualification were thought to serve primarily to sanc-
tion the lawyer for violating a conflict rule, one should expect the Court to afford
disqualified lawyers an immediate opportunity to appeal.
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would "taint" the trial, and that otherwise, these conflicts were better
relegated to disciplinary authorities. 15
The Fifth Circuit's 1992 decision in In re American Airlines, Inc 6
took precisely the opposite approach. It held that litigators who vio-
lated the applicable conflict-of-interest standards should be disquali-
fied even if the conduct of the trial would not be affected adversely if
the lawyer were to remain in the case.' 7 It reasoned that unless courts
address the impermissible conflict, it may go entirely unpunished and
that, in any event, enforcing the conflict law is the courts' business."
The court also expressed skepticism as to whether there often were
tactical motivations behind disqualification motions.1 9
The draft Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers takes no
clear stand on this question. A 1989 draft noted that "several differ-
ent sanctions and remedies" have been created to address lawyers'
15. See, eg., Armstrong v. McAlpin,, 625 F.2d 433,445-46 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(finding that bar association disciplinary machinery is better equipped to handle ethi-
cal conflicts that arise during litigation); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241,
1246 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that because disqualification would immediately disrupt
the litigation, questions about the lawyer's conduct would be better handled by other
means); see also W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The
business of the court is to dispose of litigation and not to act as a general overseer of
the ethics... unless the questioned behavior taints the trial of the cause before it.").
16. 972 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993). The case came
to the court by way of petition for a writ of mandamus. Id. at 608.
17. Id at 610-11.
18. Id at 611.
Insofar as disqualification serves a disciplinary function, courts may impose this
sanction pursuant to their inherent authority to regulate lawyers. See, ag., Pantori,
Inc. v. Stephenson, 384 So. 2d 1357, 1358-59 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1980) (finding that
Florida Constitution empowers supreme court to regulate attorney conduct). For dis-
cussions of the courts' supervisory authority over the practice of law, see generally
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 22-33 (1986) (discussing courts' inherent
powers to regulate lawyers' conduct); Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer
Regulation-The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock LJ. 1
(1989-90) (arguing that courts have an inherent, but non-exclusive, power to regulate
lawyers in the absence of statutes specifying otherwise); Note, The Inherent Power of
the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law-A Proposed Delineation, 60 Minn. L
Rev. 783, 784 (1976) (discussing the role courts play in tandem with the legislative
branch in regulating attorney conduct). Questions concerning the scope of judicial
authority to regulate lawyers arise intermittently. Most recently, the question has
been posed by the regulation recently promulgated by the Department of Justice to
govern federal prosecutors' communications with represented persons. As Rory Lit-
tle discusses in his article for this Symposium, the regulation purports to supersede
rules of conduct adopted by federal courts to regulate lawyers' communications with
represented parties. The Department defends the regulation based in part on its
claim that federal courts lack authority to regulate prosecutors' out-of-court conduct.
See Rory Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 Fordham
L. Rev. 355 (1996); Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should
Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on file with the Fordham Law Review)
[hereinafter Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct].
19. In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d at 611.
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conflicts of interest,2" and characterized disqualification of counsel as
a "sanction"-indeed, as "the most common sanction for conflicts of
interest in litigation"'" as well as "often the most effective sanction." 22
Yet, the rationales provided for disqualifying counsel seemed entirely
remedial: Disqualification, according to the 1989 draft, "assures both
that the case is well presented in court, that confidential information
of present or former clients is not misused, and, where appropriate,
that a client's interest in a lawyer's loyalty is not violated." ' The im-
plication would seem to be that disqualification of counsel is justified
principally to avert harms to clients or to the judicial process, rather
than to punish or to deter violations of the conflict rules. 24 The March
1996 Proposed Final Draft continues to refer to "sanctions and reme-
dies for conflicts of interest, '25 perhaps with the intent to distinguish
"sanctions" from "remedies, ' 26 but otherwise omits most of the ear-
lier discussion.27 The American Law Institute Director's Foreword to
the more recent draft acknowledges that a disqualification motion
may be construed either as an appeal to the court's authority to regu-
late lawyers' conduct-i.e., as a sanction-or, "in another equally co-
herent interpretation," as an appeal to the court's equitable authority
"to provide immediate specific relief against threat of irreparable or
continuing wrong"-i.e., as a remedy.1 It does not take a position,
however, as to whether courts should invoke both sources of authority
or only the latter.29
20. Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 205 at 118 (Council Draft No.
3, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Draft Restatement].
21. Id
22. Id. at 119.
23. Id at 118-19.
24. That this draft of the Restatement envisioned disqualification as a remedy, not
a sanction, is also suggested by its endorsement of a "standing" requirement. See infra
note 53.
25. Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 201 at 554 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
26. See id. ("In addition to the sanction of professional discipline, disqualifying a
lawyer from further participation in a pending matter is a common remedy for con-
flicts of interest in litigation.").
27. Oddly enough, in the Director's Foreword to the Proposed Final Draft, Profes-
sor Hazard observes that "[p]erhaps the most important issue pervading the text is
that of remedies and the related question of the precise contours of conduct that
occasions some remedy other than those provided through the disciplinary process."
Id. at xxii.
28. Id. at xxiii.
29. Professor Hazard's Foreword to the draft Restatement recognizes that the
conflict rules should not always determine the outcome of disqualification decisions.
It provides the illustration of the lawyer who, only after undertaking the representa-
tion, discovers that another lawyer in the firm formerly represented the client's adver-
sary. Even if the applicable disciplinary rule would have forbidden the lawyer from
knowingly undertaking the representation and would require the lawyer to withdraw
from the representation once the conflict is discovered, Professor Hazard suggests
that "screening" the lawyer involved in the prior representation may be a sufficient
remedy. Id. at xxv. Presumably, screening would be sufficient because insofar as the
[Vol. 65
CONFLICTS: THE JUDICIAL ROLE
2. The Judiciary's Role in Establishing Conflict Standards
The proper judicial role in developing conflict-of-interest law turns
on the extent to which courts should rely on ABA rules or other
rules30 as opposed to making ad hoc decisional law or "common law"
to set the standard of conduct with respect to litigators' conflicts of
interest. Courts have promulgated rules of professional conduct
drafted by the ABA, beginning with the 1970 Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility and, in most jurisdictions, followed by the 1983
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Both sets of rules contain con-
flict-of-interest provisions designed to apply to all lawyers, including
litigators. The ABA's apparent expectation was that, once having
promulgated these rules, courts and disciplinary authorities would em-
ploy them as the exclusive standard of conduct governing lawyers in
judicial proceedings, as well as in non-judicial settings.
At present, however, courts rely on the conflict rules to varying de-
grees. In addressing disqualification motions in civil cases, many
courts refer to the conflict rules in determining whether a lawyer im-
properly undertook or continued to represent a party in the face of an
actual or potential conflict of interest.31 But other courts, such as the
Fifth Circuit, have rejected the idea that conflict rules set the exclusive
standard for litigators, opting instead to derive the applicable standard
of conduct by contemplating the legal profession's norms "in light of
the public interest and the litigants' rights. 32
conflict rules would have forbidden the finn from accepting the representation with
screening, the rules are overinclusive. The Foreword also notes, however, that "if the
standards [of professional conduct contained in the lawyers codes] are an adequate
predicate for the sanction of professional discipline, they could not often be 'overin-
clusive' when applied in other remedial contexts" such as in the disqualification con-
text. Id. at xxiii.
This Article shares Professor Hazard's view that the standards for imposing discipli-
nary sanctions should not necessarily be employed in ruling on disqualification mo-
tions. However, it rejects Professor Hazard's view that the conflict rules are rarely
"overinclusive." The Article argues, in contrast, that the conflict rules are "overinclu-
sive" by design. See infra part II.B. As a consequence, it argues, there will often be
cases in which a litigator should be sanctioned, but not disqualified, for representing a
party in violation of the conflict rules.
30. On the question of whether federal courts should rely on the Model Rules or
draft their own, more detailed rules of professional conduct, see Green, Whose Rules
of Professional Conduct, supra note 18.
31. See, e.g., Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 837 (D.C. 1994) (reevaluating allega-
tions of impropriety by making reference to the Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility); Chrispens v. Coastal Ref. & Mktg., 897 P.d 104, 110 (Kan. 1995) (referring
to Model Rules 1.9 and 1.10 in determining whether alleged conflicts were substan-
tially related); Adam v. MacDonald Page & Co., 644 A2d 461,463 (Me. 1994) (using
the "substantial relationship test" suggested by Model Rule 1.9).
32. In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 912 (1993) (citations omitted); see In re Dresser Industries, 972 F.2d 540, 543-
44 (5th Cir. 1992) ("When presented with a motion to disqualify counsel in a more
generic civil case [not governed by statutory or constitutional provision], however, we
consider the motion governed by the ethical rules announced by the national profes-
sion in the light of the public interest and the litigants' rights.").
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Moreover, in certain classes of cases, conflict rules are largely ig-
nored by most courts. For example, judicial decisions dealing with dis-
qualification motions in criminal cases typically make no mention of
the conflict rules.33 Courts have instead developed standards of con-
duct for criminal defense lawyers on a case-by-case basis against the
background of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 4 Similarly, in
dealing with the conflicts of interest of class counsel, courts appear to
be developing an independent body of decisional law against the
background of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
B. The Significance of David Wilkins's Who Should
Regulate Lawyers?
David Wilkins's article, Who Should Regulate Lawyers? ,36 advances
the discussion of the courts' lawmaking and enforcement roles with
respect to litigators' conflicts of interest. First, it demonstrates that, at
least until now, certain conflicts of interest have been regulated more
effectively by courts than by disciplinary agencies. Second, it teaches
that insights such as this one may not justify a broad generalization
about the appropriate judicial role in regulating litigators' conflicts of
interest.
1. The Efficacy of Judicial Enforcement
In the course of developing a framework for enforcing professional
norms generally, Wilkins's article specifically addressed the enforce-
ment of conflict standards. Among other things, he observed that dis-
ciplinary controls will not effectively deter corporate law firms'
conflicts of interest, because corporate clients do not report their law-
yers' misconduct to disciplinary agencies.37 On the other hand, he as-
serted, judicial controls have been effective, as demonstrated when a
wave of disqualification motions by corporate parties in the mid-1970s
prompted corporate law firms to institute procedures to reduce the
likelihood that conflicts would occur.38 In its American Airlines deci-
sion, the Fifth Circuit relied on Wilkins's observation to justify em-
ploying disqualification widely as a sanction and not simply as a
remedy for the limited number of cases in which a lawyer's conflict of
interest might "taint" the judicial proceedings.39
33. See, e.g., Brownlee v. State, 666 So. 2d 91 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (making no
mention of conflict rules); Mitchell v. State, 405 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. 1991) (same).
34. Cf. In re Dresser, 972 F.2d at 543-44 & n.5 (suggesting that general standards
be used to evaluate a motion to disqualify).
35. See infra note 202.
36. Wilkins, supra note 9.
37. Id. at 827-28.
38. Id at 828.
39. In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 912 (1993).
[Vol. 65
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Wilkins's insights about the superiority of disqualification over dis-
cipline from the perspective of enforcing conflict rules challenges con-
ventional academic wisdom about the courts' appropriate law-
enforcement role. The seminal academic work on this issue is James
Lindgren's 1982 article, which criticized the use of disqualification as a
sanction for violations of the conflict rules and endorsed the Second
Circuit's approach, which requires a demonstration that the trial will
be "tainted" by the impermissible conflict.' More recent academic
writings, such as those of Steven H. Goldberg4 and Nathan Crystal,42
have embraced this view. 3 Wilkins's article invites a closer examina-
tion of their position that courts seeking to enforce the conflict rules
have effective alternatives to disqualification."
40. James Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of Attorney Disqualification, 1982
Am. B. Found. Res. J. 421, 423.
41. Steven H. Goldberg, The Former Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad
Move in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 227 (1987).
Professor Goldberg's article focuses on conflicts of interest arising when a law firm
represents a new client against a former client. He argues that courts have no legiti-
mate interest in employing disqualification to vindicate the profession's rules of eth-
ics, except when violations of these rules affect the functioning of the adversary
system. Id. at 267-68. He argues further that the conflict rules restricting a lawyer
from undertaking a representation adverse to a former client advance no legitimate
interest of the adversary system, in part because truth-seeking would be promoted by
disclosure of the confidences that these rules are intended to protect. Id. at 269-80.
42. Nathan M. Crystal, Disqualification of Counsel for Unrelated Matter Conflicts
of Interest, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 273 (1990).
Professor Crystal argues that, under some circumstances, a law firm should be per-
mitted to represent one client in litigation against another client whom the law firm
represents in an unrelated matter. This situation may arise when: (1) a long-term
client asks the firm to represent it in litigation against another client; (2) the firm's
conflicts check fails to reveal that the adversary is represented in another matter, (3) a
corporate client's business reorganizes; or (4) a law firm merges. Id. at 274. He pro-
poses an analytical framework that focuses on two questions. The first is whether the
dual representation is improper, because the adversary in litigation is a current client
who will not or cannot provide effective consent. Id. at 298-309. The second is
whether disqualification is an appropriate remedy given a balance between the risks
of tainting the trial or undermining the relationship with the non-litigation client, on
one hand, and the countervailing costs of disqualification to the client represented in
litigation, on the other. Id. at 310-11.
43. Another important contribution to the subject of disqualification decisions is
Kenneth L. Penegar, The Loss of Innocence: A Brief History of Law Firm Disqualifi-
cation in the Courts, 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 831 (1995). Professor Penegar first traces
the historical development of disqualification doctrine, id. at 837-83, and then exam-
ines the doctrinal development against a social and cultural backdrop that includes
the growth of large law firms, id. at 889-93, and what he terms "the cult of the litiga-
tor." Id. at 893-96. He concludes that an initially clear distinction between "codes for
discipline and court-created rules for trial conduct" broke down over time, and that
the courts' eventual reliance on conflict rules as the basis for disqualification decisions
corresponds with the profession's abdication of its traditional responsibility for en-
forcing professional norms. ld. at 899.
44. Professor Lindgren argues that in cases in which disqualification motions are
filed, courts should refer the lawyer to disciplinary authorities. Although disciplinary
authorities may generally be reluctant to address conflicts of interest in litigation, he
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
2. Why Context Counts
Wilkins's article also demonstrates, however, that the utility of judi-
cial controls, or any other controls, on lawyer conduct depends on a
variety of factors, including both the type of conduct to be regulated
and the nature of the client whom the lawyer represents. Thus, as
Wilkins underscored in a subsequent article, context counts in the
area of professional regulation.45
This is important to bear in mind because the conflict of interest
standards are designed to forbid lawyers from representing clients in a
vast array of contexts where there is a significant risk that either the
lawyer's obligation to other clients or the lawyer's own interests will
adversely affect the representation. For example, the ABA rules ad-
dress conflicts arising out of a lawyer's representation of one client in
a matter adverse to another client 46 or to a former client,47 conflicts
arising out of a lawyer's representation of joint-clients whose interests
may diverge,48 conflicts arising out of a lawyer's financial or property
interests that are implicated by the representation 4 9 and conflicts aris-
ing out of a lawyer's family relationship with an adversary's lawyer.50
Further, in each of these contexts, the conflict rules address the crucial
question of whether the lawyer's conflict of interest will be imputed to
other members of the lawyer's firm or law office.5
Wilkins's insight suggests that generalizations about the courts' role
in developing or enforcing conflict-of-interest standards may be rele-
vant to some categories of conflicts but not to others. While many
distinctions might be made, the most obvious one for purposes of judi-
cial enforcement is between conflicts of interest that are likely to be
the subject of disqualification motions and those that arise in litigation
but typically escape judicial notice.
argues that they will be more likely to do so when a referral is made by a court.
Lindgren, supra note 40, at 436-37.
Similarly, Professor Goldberg argues that insofar as the profession seeks to prevent
disclosures of client confidences, lawyers who improperly reveal or use client confi-
dences should be sanctioned personally. Goldberg, supra note 41, at 286. This would
be more appropriate than disciplinary sanctions which punish the lawyer's client
rather than the lawyer. Id.
Fmally, Professor Crystal argues that either a damage award or a disciplinary sanc-
tion is preferable to disqualification when the lawyer's conflict does not substantially
risk tainting a trial, because both "can be calibrated to reflect the degree of wrongdo-
ing," while, at the same time, avoiding the costs that disqualification inflicts on both
the client and the legal system. Crystal, supra note 42, at 287-88, 311-12.
45. See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye,
Scholer, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1145 (1993).
46. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.7(a).
47. See id. Rule 1.9.
48. See id. Rules 1.7(b)(2), 1.8(g).
49. See id. Rule 1.7(b), 1.8(j); Model Code, supra note 2, DR 5-101(A).
50. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.8(i).
51. See id. Rule 1.10.
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Most often, disqualification motions implicate conflicts between the
lawyer's duty to the client represented in the litigation and the law-
yer's duty to another client or former client who seeks the lawyer's
disqualification. For example, the defendant may seek to disqualify
the plaintiff's lawyer because that lawyer or someone else in the law-
yer's firm previously represented the defendant and would be tempted
to misuse confidences acquired in the former representation to the
plaintiff's benefit and the former client's detriment.51 In this category
of cases, a party has knowledge of a possible conflict of interest, an
incentive to call the conflict of interest to the court's attention (cre-
ated by the prospect of disqualifying the adversary's lawyer), and,
although not invariably required by law, "standing" to challenge the
representation.5 3 Consequently, the academic literature on disqualifi-
cation for conflicts of interest in litigation has focused on those partic-
ular classes of conflicts of interest that implicate the interests of
adversaries.'
Other categories of conflict of interest may well be more prevalent
in litigation, yet evade judicial review. One example is the conflict
between the lawyer's own business interests and the interests of the
lawyer's client.5 5 The client is less likely to be aware of the facts un-
derlying this type of conflict. If the client knows of the conflict and is
troubled by it, the client will have no incentive to bring the conflict to
the court's attention rather than simply discharge the lawyer. At least
in the civil context, no other party is likely to have the requisite
knowledge and incentive either.5 6
52. See generally Goldberg, supra note 41 (explaining the evolution of successive
conflict disqualification and rejecting Model Rules addressing successive conflicts).
53. Compare In re Yam Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir.
1976) (stating that only a client has standing to raise a conflict) and In re Appeal of
Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 221 (Del. 1990) (stating that non-client has stand-
ing only if "he or she can demonstrate that the opposing counsel's conflict somehow
prejudiced his or her rights") with Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825, 828 (1st Cir.
1987) (allowing non-client to raise conflict).
An early version of the draft Restatement proposed a standing requirement. See
1989 Draft Restatement, supra note 20, at 83-84 ("The costs associated with disqualifi-
cation require that standing to seek disqualification ordinarily be limited to present or
former clients who would be adversely affected by the continued representation.").
54. See, e.g., Crystal, supra note 42, at 274 (addressing the "conflict [that] occurs
when a lawyer represents one client while that lawyer or another member of her firm
is simultaneously representing that client's adversary, not directly against the first cli-
ent, but in an unrelated matter"); Goldberg, supra note 41 (addressing conflicts aris-
ing out of litigation against a former client).
55. See, e.g., Peggy Walz, Inc. v. Liz Wain, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 1579, 1996 WL 88556
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1996) (involving an incorporation agreement providing plaintiffs
lawyer with a direct financial stake in plaintiffs cause of action).
56. Following an unfavorable resolution of the litigation, however, a client who
believes its lawyer had a conflict of interest may raise this in connection with a civil
lawsuit against the lawyer. See, e.g., Damron v. Herzog, 67 F.3d 211, 213 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that a former client may bring a cause of action when an attorney
breaches her duty "not to represent an interest adverse to [the] former client on a
matter substantially related to the matter of [the] engagement").
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Another example, in civil litigation, is the conflict between the in-
terests of jointly represented parties. The prevailing rules forbid a
lawyer from representing joint-clients, even with their consent, unless
the lawyer's belief that he can represent both clients adequately is ob-
jectively reasonable.5 7 Yet, in cases where the lawyer cannot ade-
quately represent co-parties to litigation, the clients themselves would
ordinarily have no reason to complain to the court, even assuming
they recognized the problem. 8 The adversary, presumptively the
beneficiary of the lawyer's inability to represent the joint-clients ade-
quately, would have no incentive to ask the court to intervene.
Although courts occasionally acknowledge that lawyers have a duty to
report other lawyers' misconduct and that this alone would justify
raising conflict of interest questions with the court,59 courts tend to
view with suspicion disqualification motions from parties who them-
selves have nothing at stake. The exception, of course, is in criminal
cases, where a prosecutor's motion to disqualify a lawyer representing
multiple defendants6" can be justified in various ways, including by the
prosecutor's interest in protecting against the later reversal of a crimi-
nal conviction and by the prosecutor's special "responsibility [as] a
minister of justice"'61 to promote the fairness of the trial.6'
Finally, an additional implication of Wilkins's teaching about the
significance of context is that to resolve satisfactorily questions of in-
stitutional choice with respect to conflicts of interest in litigation, one
must turn to a subject that Wilkins's article set aside. Wilkins's article
did not address the question of who should establish enforceable pro-
fessional norms. To facilitate his discussion of enforcement issues,
Wilkins "bracket[ed] disputes over the content of professional
norms" 63 as well as disputes over who should determine their content
and how they should do so. For purposes of his analysis, Wilkins as-
sumed that all enforcement officials will be interpreting a single set of
rules, either the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct or the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, so that lawyers will
57. See Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.7(b)(1); Model Code, supra note 2, DR
5-105(C).
58. For an interesting and much discussed counter-example, see Fiandaca v. Cun-
ningham, 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987).
59. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 563 F.2d
671, 673 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that non-client's attorneys are "authorized to report
any ethical violations committed in the case").
60. See, e.g., United States v. Rahman, 837 F. Supp. 64, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (in-
volving government's motion to bar defense counsel from representing more than one
defendant).
61. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 3.8 cmt.
62. See generally Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor's Re-
sponsibility When Defense Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 Am. J.
Crim. L. 323, 356-65 (1989) (describing justifications for a prosecutor's disqualifica-
tion motion).
63. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 809.
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be subject to sanction for violating the standards set forth in one of
those sets of rules."r As will be shown, however, questions of institu-
tional choice with respect to conflict-of-interest standards in litigation
cannot fully be answered without considering the content of those
standards.
C. A Paradigmatic Case: IBM v. Levin
As a focal point, this Article employs a decision, IBM v. Levin,15
which is a favorite in the secondary literature and which Wldkins cites
in his discussion of conflicts of interest in litigation. He uses the case
to illustrate that it is difficult for a large corporation to keep track of
what different law firms representing it are doing on its behalf, much
less what work those law firms may be doing contrary to the corpora-
tion's interests on behalf of other clients. I Andrew Kaufman's
casebook includes the decision as a principal case and uses it profita-
bly to raise various interesting questions.67 Professor Crystal uses
Levin extensively both to develop a framework for addressing what he
terms "unrelated matter conflicts" and to illustrate how his framework
should apply.6s It is used here for the limited purpose of providing a
set of facts with which to illustrate a series of arguments. It is with
some measure of irony that the decision is used, given the admonition,
already noted, that one must beware of generalizations drawn from
particular conflict scenarios. Nevertheless, one must start somewhere.
Dozens of other cases would undoubtedly serve just as well.
Consider, then, the following oversimplified version of the facts of
Levin. In March 1972, Levin Computer Corp., a computer leasing
firm, retained the law firm of Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey to file
an antitrust action against IBM. Levin Computer Corp.'s relationship
with the firm dated back to 1966. It turned out, however, that IBM
also had a relationship with the firm, which had represented IBM in
labor matters unrelated to the antitrust action. After undertaking rep-
resentation of Levin Computer Corp., the Carpenter, Bennett firm
took on a series of new labor matters for IBM after purportedly ap-
prising a member of the IBM legal staff of the firm's role in the anti-
trust action. Over the course of almost five years, the firm continued
64. Id at 810.
65. 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978).
66. See Wflkins, supra note 9, at 827 n.112.
67. Andrew L. Kaufman, Problems in Professional Responsibility 42-52 (3d ed.
1989). Other casebooks also employ Levin to varying degrees. See e.g., Stephen Gil-
lers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics 255-57 (4th ed. 1995) (dis-
cussing circumstances where a lawyer may act adversely to a client on an unrelated
matter); Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, Problems and Materials on Pro-
fessional Responsibility 148 (6th ed. 1995) (discussing when a person is a "Client" for
conflict purposes); Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering
636-37 (2d ed. 1994) (same).
68. See Crystal, supra note 42, at 278-79, 291-92, 295-300, 306, 313-14.
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to represent IBM in labor matters while also representing Levin Com-
puter Corp. against IBM. In early 1977, a different member of IBM's
legal staff realized that Carpenter, Bennett was simultaneously repre-
senting IBM and its adversary, prompting IBM both to terminate the
law firm's representation in labor matters and, in June of that year, to
file a motion in the antitrust action to disqualify the firm. The district
court granted the motion and, in June 1978, the court of appeals
affirmed.
The court in Levin disqualified Carpenter, Bennett to enforce a
conflict-of-interest principle that, until recently, seemed fairly uncon-
troversial.6 9 It is that a lawyer may not represent a party in a lawsuit
against an existing client unless the existing client will not be
prejudiced and both clients consent. This principle, although clearly
embodied in Model Rule 1.7(a),7° was not so clearly captured by the
counterpart provision of the predecessor Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. Part of the court's task in Levin was therefore to deal
with this interpretive question.7' Another part of its task was to deter-
mine whether IBM had in fact consented to the firm's representation
of its adversary.72 For purposes of the discussion that follows, how-
ever, one should accept that the rule appropriately applies to a lawyer
deciding whether to undertake a new representation and that Carpen-
ter, Bennett violated the rule by failing to obtain IBM's informed
consent.
The remaining question before the court in Levin was whether, in
1977, five years into the representation of Levin Computer Corp., it
should disqualify Carpenter, Bennett from continuing the representa-
tion. This question implicates the court's role in promulgating conflict
standards as well as in enforcing conflict standards. This can be seen
by considering how the court should approach disqualification in two
situations: The first is where the only possible reason to disqualify the
law firm would be to sanction it for violating the applicable conflict
rule; the second is where the only possible reason to disqualify the law
firm would be to remedy past or future harm to IBM.
II. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT: DISQUALIFICATION AS A SANCTION
Suppose that in 1977, when the court in Levin examined the ques-
tion of whether to disqualify Carpenter, Bennett, it found that the
69. See infra note 136.
70. Model Rule 1.7(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will
be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.7(a); see also infra note 136.
71. IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 279-80 (3d Cir. 1978).
72. Id. at 281.
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firm's representation of both IBM and IBM's adversary, Levin Com-
puter Corp., had not harmed IBM during the previous five years and
that no harm was likely to befall IBM in the future if the firm contin-
ued to prosecute the antitrust action. Thus, disqualification would
serve no remedial function.
In that event, the court would be left with the question of whether
to employ disqualification for some nonremedial purpose, given that
Carpenter, Bennett had violated the applicable standard of conduct
by undertaking to represent both IBM and Levin Computer Corp.
The most obvious purpose would be regulatory: to punish the law
firm for violating the applicable conflict rule and thereby to deter
other lawyers from doing the same under similar circumstances.
Two arguments might be raised against employing disqualification
as a judicial sanction for a litigator's impermissible representation of
conflicting interests. The first, examined below in part ll.A., is that
courts are the wrong forum for resolving issues of professional disci-
pline. The second, examined in part II.B., is that disqualification is
the wrong sanction. Finding the second argument persuasive, this Part
argues that courts should satisfy their enforcement responsibilities by
sanctioning lawyers personally for violating the conflict rules, while
reserving disqualification for cases in which it is a necessary remedy.
A. The Appropriateness of the Judicial Forum
One reason not to disqualify the law firm as a regulatory measure
would be because disciplinary bodies, not courts, are the appropriate
fora for punishing professional misconduct. This view is summed up
in the Second Circuit's admonition that "the business of the court is to
dispose of litigation and not to act as a general overseer of the ethics
of those who practice here unless the questioned behavior taints the
trial of the cause before it."'73 Certainly, if one believed that discipli-
nary bodies were already dealing effectively with litigators' impermis-
sible conflicts of interest, disqualification would seem to be excessive
at worst and unnecessary at best. There are three possible responses
to this view.
1. The Need to Preserve Judicial Integrity
One response to the notion that disciplining bodies deal effectively
with conflicts of interest in litigation is that disqualification remains
necessary, not as a sanction, but to protect the "integrity" of the pro-
ceeding.74 The argument is that it undermines the court's integrity to
73. W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Lefrak v.
Arabian American Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1975)).
74. See Levin, 579 F.2d at 283 ("[D]isqualification in circumstances such as these
where specific injury to the moving party has not been shown is primarily justified as a
vindication of the integrity of the bar."); cf Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160
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allow a lawyer with a conflict of interest to remain in the representa-
tion, and thus to continue to violate the applicable rules of profes-
sional conduct. The force of this argument derives, however, from a
questionable assumption about what it means when a court denies a
disqualification motion. If one assumes that a lawyer acts unethically
by remaining in the representation after a disqualification motion is
denied-i.e., that the lawyer has an ethical obligation to withdraw
notwithstanding the court's decision-then this argument about judi-
cial integrity has considerable sway. But that need not be what deny-
ing a disqualification motion means. While the court's decision would
not necessarily mean that the lawyer acted properly in initially under-
taking the representation, it can mean that the lawyer acts properly in
remaining in the representation after the disqualification motion is de-
nied.7' Indeed, the court's decision should have this meaning unless,
perhaps, the court declines to address the merits of the motion. It
would be unfair implicitly to invite the lawyer to remain in the repre-
sentation by denying a disqualification motion, but also to sanction
the lawyer for accepting the invitation.
Thus, if the court in Levin had denied IBM's motion and thereby
authorized Carpenter, Bennett to remain as counsel in the antitrust
action, a disciplinary body could fairly punish the firm for undertaking
the representation and remaining in the representation for the first
five years, but not for failing to withdraw from the representation af-
ter the disqualification motion was denied. This might mean, of
course, that the court was applying a different conflict-of-interest stan-
dard to determine whether the firm may continue in the representa-
tion than it would apply in a disciplinary proceeding to the question of
whether the firm properly entered into the representation. There is
no reason why it should not do so. As will be discussed in part III, the
standards of conduct governing litigators' conflicts of interest are judi-
cially constructed and may be constructed differently for different pro-
cedural contexts.
The argument about judicial integrity becomes considerably weaker
when one accepts that, by denying a disqualification motion, a court
implicitly declares that based on the facts then known to it, the lawyer
would not be acting unethically by continuing in the representation,
even if the lawyer impermisibly undertook the representation in the
first place. One might argue that, to preserve its integrity, the court
must nevertheless disqualify the lawyer as a sanction for the past mis-
conduct. But doing so would be vastly inconsistent with how courts
(1988) ("Federal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials
are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession .. ").
75. Denial of a disqualification motion can also mean that the court is agnostic as
to whether the lawyer's participation in the ongoing representation is appropriate.
Thus, the continued participation could later be sanctioned by a disciplinary body.
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generally treat past instances of misconduct,76 including lawyer mis-
conduct.' Given that undertaking an impermissible conflict of inter-
est is misconduct directed primarily at a client, not the court, and
given the considerable costs of disqualification-a matter to which
this Article will return in a moment 7 8 -it would be hard to justify dis-
qualifying counsel in the name of "judicial integrity."
2. The Efficiency of Judicial Enforcement
An alternative response to the Second Circuit's view that courts
should generally be enforcing disciplinary rules is that, when it comes
to litigators' conflicts of interest, judicial enforcement is more cost-
effective than enforcement by disciplinary agencies, so that if one in-
stitution should defer to another, disciplinary agencies should defer to
courts. There are several possible reasons for preferring judicial en-
forcement. First, a court begins with some familiarity with the parties
and the factual context in which the alleged conflict arose, and there-
fore will be a more efficient factfinder than the judge in a disciplinary
proceeding who has no initial knowledge of relevant facts. Second, a
disqualification motion shifts the entire cost of prosecution from a
public prosecutor to a private party. Further, the lawyer for the pri-
vate party seeking disqualification can proceed more efficiently than a
public prosecutor because, like the trial judge, that lawyer starts out
conversant with the relevant facts. Third, decisions of a disciplinary
body are typically subject to review through the judicial process. Be-
ginning a disciplinary proceeding in the trial court cuts out a potential
stage of review. Finally, a judicial sanction generally will be more
timely than a disciplinary sanction, because disciplinary bodies typi-
cally wait until the conclusion of a litigation before initiating proceed-
ings based on a litigator's alleged misconduct.
Some courts, however, would find this efficiency argument unper-
suasive. Among the reasons they might give are that agencies that
address disciplinary matters on a regular basis can deal with lawyers'
alleged conflicts more efficiently and more fairly because of their su-
perior expertise. 79 Another might be that prosecutions by disinter-
76. An analogy may be drawn to the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment.
At one time, the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence was justified by "the impera-
tive of judicial integrity," Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960), but the
Supreme Court has since rejected that rationale. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 922 (1984). Thus, a court may condemn the manner in which the state, through
its officers, obtains evidence, and may afford a civil remedy against the state or its
officers for the misconduct, while allowing the evidence to be used in a criminal
proceeding.
77. See, e.g., Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir.
1975) (finding counsel's conduct insensitive, but not necessitating counsel's
disqualification).
78. See infra part I.B.
79. Cf. In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 1995) (arguing that misconduct in
federal court proceedings should be prosecuted by state disciplinary authorities).
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ested disciplinary authorities are preferred over prosecutions by
lawyers for private parties, to ensure the fairness of proceedings. 8
Additionally, many judges undoubtedly believe that they have too
much other work or more important work than overseeing the ethics
of one portion of the bar. Their time is more precious than that of a
disciplinary agency. Ancillary litigation concerning conflicts of inter-
est distracts courts from their principal mission of resolving disputes
between litigants.
3. Lack of Notice
The third response to the Second Circuit's approach is the one pro-
vided by David Wilkins and endorsed by the Fifth Circuit, namely,
that disciplinary agencies, even given sufficient resources,8' cannot ad-
equately enforce conflict rules because the conflicts that are alleged in
judicial proceedings would not be called to the attention of discipli-
nary bodies. Wilkins's explanation is that complaints are made typi-
cally to disciplinary bodies by individuals, not by corporations. The
corporate parties whose interests are implicated by disqualification
motions do not generally report lawyer misconduct to disciplinary
agencies, but prefer other methods of controlling lawyers.' An alter-
native explanation draws on Wilkins's insight that disciplinary bodies
are most often presented "'agency problems,' [which] involve cases in
which lawyer misconduct primarily injures clients," whereas courts are
most often brought complaints about "'externality problems,' . . .
[which] involve cases in which lawyers and clients together impose[d]
unjustified harms on third parties or on the legal framework.""8 Wil-
kins categorizes "representing conflicting interests" as an agency
problem, rather than an externality problem,' but the appropriate-
ness of this characterization is doubtful. Conflicts between the inter-
ests of one current client and another current or former client are, in
the very least, hybrids. From the perspective of the real "victim" of
the conflict-the current or former client who is not represented in
the litigation-the lawyer's conflict of interest presents an "externality
Two related but seemingly inconsistent arguments might be that disciplinary hear-
ing panels are preferable to judges either because: (1) insofar as they are comprised
of fellow lawyers, a disciplined lawyer is more likely to take their criticisms seriously;
and (2) insofar as they include nonlawyers, their judgments are less likely to seem
unduly protective of lawyers accused of misconduct.
80. Cf. Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 811-12
(1987) (holding that in a contempt proceeding, appointment of a party's lawyer to
serve as prosecutor creates an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the
fairness of the criminal justice system).
81. Presently, even when violations of conflict rules are called to their attention,
disciplinary bodies, because of limited resources, will often decline to commence pro-
ceedings as a matter of discretion in cases in which no actual harm occurs.
82. Wtlkins, supra note 9, at 824-30.
83. Id. at 819-20.
84. Id. at 826-28.
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problem" involving the risk of unjustified harm to that third party,
who can therefore be expected to look to the court for redress. Wil-
kins's dichotomy between agency and externality problems obscures
the point that, however one characterizes the problem, parties per-
ceiving themselves to be wronged by a lawyer will seek the most effec-
tive and/or least costly redress available. In cases involving pending
litigation, that will typically mean turning to the court to redress
wrongdoing by a lawyer other than one retained to represent that cli-
ent in the litigation. 5 Disciplinary agencies will be a last resort be-
cause the explicit purpose of discipline is to vindicate the public
interest in promoting proper professional conduct, not to remedy
harms caused by a lawyer's improprieties.8 6
Accepting the premise that corporate clients-for whatever rea-
son-do not report their lawyers' conflicts of interest to disciplinary
agencies, one might nevertheless question the conclusion that courts
must take on the disciplinary function. If corporate clients have pre-
ferred in the past to seek the disqualification of lawyers who owed
them a duty to refrain from representing their adversaries, rather than
to report the alleged conflicts to disciplinary bodies, one must con-
sider why that has been. To the extent that disciplinary bodies have
been ignored because they lack resources to deal with any but the
most egregious conflicts of interest, the answer might be to expand
their resources, rather than shifting part of their function to the courts.
To the extent that corporations have preferred a combination of other
devices for controlling errant lawyers as Wilkins suggests-for exam-
ple, corporations may deny the lawyers future business-one might
consider the importance of disqualification in the mix. To the extent
that a corporation, the most sophisticated of clients, sees no need to
report its lawyer's alleged conflict unless the corporation will some-
how benefit from doing so, one must consider whether the wrongdo-
ing is serious enough to merit judicial attention, even assuming that
there is no other effective means of enforcement.
85. The situation is different in criminal cases in which a defendant is appointed
counsel. Unable to discharge the trial lawyer and retain another, the defendant who
is displeased with the lawyer's performance can be expected to bring the complaint to
the trial court, rather than to a disciplinary authority. Following a conviction, the
defendant similarly can be expected to raise the problem with an appellate court.
Although the underlying problems can be described as "agency" problems, rather
than "externality" problems, the defendant will look to the court because it is the
most effective forum to redress his complaints-the trial court by substituting a new
lawyer prior to trial, or the appellate court by overturning a conviction.
86. See, eg., ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 1.1 (1992),
reprinted in ABA/BNA Law. Manual on Prof. Conduct 01:801, 01:807 (1992) [herein-
after ABA Standards] ("The purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the
public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will
not discharge, or are unlikely properly to discharge their professional duties to clients,
the public, the legal system, and the legal profession.").
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B. The Appropriateness of the Sanction
1. Why the Punishment Does Not Fit the Wrong
The more compelling argument against the court's use of disqualifi-
cation as a sanction is the lack of fit between the punishment and the
wrongdoing. The wrongdoer is the lawyer who failed to comply with
the applicable rules of professional conduct. It is the lawyer's duty to
comply with the conflict rules, not the client's duty. But the burden of
disqualification falls primarily on the client who is denied the chosen
lawyer in the midst of the representation and secondarily on the court
and the public. As an early draft of the Restatement observed:
The costs imposed on a client by disqualification of the client's law-
yer can be substantial. At a minimum, the client must incur the
costs of finding a new lawyer and educating that lawyer about the
facts and issues. The costs of delay in the proceeding are borne by
the client in part, but also by the tribunal and society.8
Thus, by disqualifying counsel, courts are punishing clients to regulate
their lawyers.
The burden on the disqualified lawyer, in contrast, is far less direct
than any of the sanctions traditionally imposed for professional mis-
conduct, such as a public or private censure, suspension or disbarment
in the disciplinary context,8 8 or monetary sanctions in the judicial con-
text.89 The lawyer may suffer some reputational damage insofar as the
disqualification is publicized, but less than would be incurred if the
sanction were specifically directed at the lawyer. The lawyer will also
suffer some financial loss, although an indirect and immeasurable one,
since lost fees will be partially offset by the time saved once the repre-
sentation is concluded. While it is true that disqualification does serve
as a rebuke to a lawyer and that the prospect of disqualification dis-
courages a litigator from undertaking an impermissible representa-
tion, the regulatory benefits to be achieved by enforcing the conflict
rules via disqualification rulings seem to be far outweighed by the
costs to the innocent client and to the judicial process.
This assumes, of course, that the client is innocent. If the client
knew that the lawyer's representation was impermissible and assumed
the risk that the lawyer would be disqualified as a consequence, the
sanction would seem less troublesome. It might then be appropriate
to punish the client as well as the lawyer. There is no justification,
87. 1989 Draft Restatement, supra note 20, at 83; see Bergeron v. Mackler, 623
A.2d 489, 493 (Conn. 1993) (holding that a court ruling on a disqualification motion
"must be... mindful of the fact that a client whose attorney is disqualified may suffer
the loss of time and money in finding new counsel and 'may lose the benefit of its
longtime counsel's specialized knowledge of its operations."' (citation omitted)).
88. See, e.g., ABA Standards, supra note 86, Standards 2.1 - 2.8 (listing various
sanctions).
89. Cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (allowing imposition of monetary sanctions on violating
attorneys or law firms).
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however, for presuming that a client knowingly accepts the risk of the
lawyer's disqualification. Further, in most cases there will be no spe-
cific facts to warrant the contrary conclusion that the client was as
guilty as the lawyer. Indeed, this is the flipside of Wilkins's point
about Levin. As noted earlier, Wilkins observes that it was difficult
for IBM, the victim of the Carpenter, Bennett's conflict, to know "that
it was being represented and sued by the same firm."' It would have
been no less difficult for Levin to know, without being told by Carpen-
ter, Bennett, that its law firm was simultaneously representing its ad-
versary in unrelated matters.
To be sure, the conflict rules require lawyers to obtain informed
consent before undertaking to represent possibly conflicting interests,
and, in the usual case, it would be fair to assume that a lawyer has
complied with the applicable conflict rules. But once a lawyer has
demonstrably failed to comply with one aspect of the conflict rules-
for example, by representing two parties whose interests irreconcila-
bly conflict or, as in Levin, by failing to obtain informed consent from
one client before representing its adversary-one can no longer as-
sume that the lawyer has complied with other aspects of the rules.
Nor is it appropriate to put the burden of disqualification on clients
to create an incentive for them to avoid the possibility that their law-
yers will violate the conflict rules. It seems axiomatic that lawyers, not
clients, are the appropriate ones to avoid these violations. Clients not
only are far less likely than their lawyers to know the facts giving rise
to an impermissible conflict, but they are also less likely to know and
understand the rules governing litigators' conflicts of interest.9' That
is why lawyers have the burden of obtaining informed consent from
their clients and, in some cases, are not allowed to undertake the rep-
resentation even with client consent.
Further, one cannot easily adduce facts to overcome the assumption
that the client was unaware of the lawyer's impropriety and the conse-
quent risk of disqualification. To do so, one would ordinarily have to
inquire into conversations between the lawyer and the client. Such an
inquiry is ordinarily impermissible, however, because of the attorney-
client privilege.
2. Why Personal Sanctions Are Preferable
Rather than disqualifying counsel, the more appropriate sanction
for a violation of the conflict rules would be one directed at the lawyer
personally. It may be that individual judges presently have inherent
90. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 827 n.112.
91. This is true even in cases of corporate clients. The corporate officer hiring
outside counsel to represent the corporation is often a nonlawyer. Even when that
officer is in-house counsel, he or she may not be trained as a litigator, and, cose-
quently, may be less likely than outside counsel to recognize that circumstances give
rise to a conflict of interest.
1996]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
authority to impose such a sanction.' If not, just as courts have au-
thority to establish formal disciplinary mechanisms, they almost cer-
tainly have authority to establish internal processes by which
individual judges may discipline lawyers who appear before them for
violating the conflict rules in the course of litigation, rather than refer-
ring those lawyers to a disciplinary body.
The court's sanction would serve a regulatory function-explicitly,
directly, and exclusively. Thus, the court would select a sanction
designed to deter the lawyer, and similarly situated lawyers, from un-
dertaking such improper representations in the future.93 Unlike a dis-
qualification order, the sanction would not serve to remedy the
conflict of interest. Thus, it would not be measured to compensate the
client or former client who is wronged by the conflict, as would an
award of damages in civil litigation. Attempts to match monetary
sanctions with the extent of harm that an aggrieved client suffered
would almost certainly engender lengthy fact-findings on this collat-
eral issue. The point of integrating the disciplinary hearing with the
disqualification hearing would be to make the disciplinary process ef-
ficient, not to embroil the court in ancillary fact-findings.
Similarly, it would be a mistake to deprive the lawyer of a fee for
the continued representation of the client in litigation, thereby possi-
92. Cf. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-67 (1980) (holding that
federal judges have inherent power to issue sanctions for contempt against attorneys
and may have power to levy costs against counsel); Bower v. Weisman, 674 F. Supp.
109, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that courts have inherent power to dismiss a lawyer
for peijury). See generally Deborah T. Landis, Annotation, Inherent Power of Federal
District Court to Impose Monetary Sanctions on Counsel in Absence of Contempt of
Court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 789 (1986) (discussing power of district courts to impose mone-
tary sanctions on counsel).
93. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (Sanctions must be "limited to what is sufficient to deter
repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct.").
The ABA Standards might provide a starting point for considering the appropriate
sanction. The Standards, however, although specifically addressing conflicts of inter-
est, see ABA Standards, supra note 86, Standard 4.3, are not entirely appropriate for
at least two reasons. First, they contemplate that discipline will occur after the effect
of a conflict of interest can be determined. Thus, a principal consideration is the
extent to which a client has been injured as a result of the conflict of interest. In the
context of litigation, however, a conflict of interest that is likely to cause serious harm
will result in disqualification. Insofar as disqualification averts serious harm, a sanc-
tion based on the amount of actual harm caused will not adequately reflect the seri-
ousness of the wrongdoing. Second, the ABA Standards contemplate a more limited
range of sanctions than may be available to the courts. The principal sanctions con-
templated by the ABA Standards are disbarment, suspension, reprimand, admonition
and probation. Id. Standards 2.1 - 2.7. Although they also contemplate the possibili-
ties of restitution and assessment of costs, they do not consider monetary sanctions.
See id. Standard 2.8(a)-(b). Monetary sanctions would provide an appropriate middle
ground between disbarment or suspension, which may seem unduly harsh, and repri-
mand or admonition, which may seem unduly lenient. Cf. Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech
Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (doubling costs on appeal as sanction for
various misconduct, including misrepresenting the lower court record through selec-
tive quotation).
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bly undermining the lawyer's zeal for that client's cause.' Instead,
the court should seek to do "rough justice," as sentencing judges do in
criminal cases-at least where their discretion is not severely re-
stricted by sentencing guidelines- and as disciplinary bodies now do.
In cases involving close questions, a public finding of impropriety
might be enough to discourage future violations,95 given lawyers' ordi-
nary concern for their professional reputation.96 In cases of clear and
willful violations, however, a substantial monetary sanction-i.e. one
well in excess of the expected fee for undertaking the representa-
tion-would more likely be appropriate in order to remove the eco-
nomic incentive for violating the conflict rules. In extremely rare
cases-perhaps involving lawyers who repeatedly and blatantly vio-
late the conflict rules-the appropriate sanction might be suspension
or disbarment, effective after the conclusion of the case, unless dis-
qualification is necessary as a remedy.
The personal sanction would serve as a more direct penalty, and
potentially a more effective deterrent, than disqualification. 7 It
would also avoid the attendant costs to the innocent client' and the
94. Professor Crystal has endorsed this approach. See Crystal, supra note 42, at
287-88, 311-12.
95. Cf. Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479,482 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that Rule
11 sanctions may include warnings, oral reprimands, or written admonitions).
96. Cf. In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 76 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (involving an
appeal from sanctions brought exclusively for reputational reasons).
97. See Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Lawyers' Conflicts of Interest,
60 Fordham L. Rev. 579, 591-92 (1992) (arguing that imposing "heavy sanctions" on
law firms that violate bright-line conflict rules would "structure incentives so as to
minimize the number of violations that take place in order to avoid the difficulties of
running a clean-up operation, at enormous inconvenience and expense to everyone,
after the conflicts have occurred").
98. One of the ironies, if not perversities, of the prevailing disqualification doc-
trine is that while it places little weight on the client's innocence, it accounts for the
"innocence" of the law firm that is subject to a conflict of interest. For example, in
cases in which a conflict of interest arises unexpectedly in the course of the represen-
tation-such as where a law firm's corporate client acquires a company against which
the firm is litigating--courts are more apt to allow a law firm to represent a party in
litigation against another client who is represented in unrelated matters, notwith-
standing the general rule forbidding such representation. See, e.g., Whiting Corp. v.
White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting that the plaintiff's firm
"is innocent of any wrongdoing" where its long-time corporate client acquired an in-
terest in the defendant corporation); Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264,
272 (D. Del. 1980) (finding no ethical violation when a law firm represented the cor-
porate plaintiff against the corporate defendant which became a subsidiary of the cor-
porate parent of another law firm client ten months after the litigation commenced).
These decisions reflect in part the courts' assumption that one purpose, if not the sole
purpose, of disqualification is to sanction lawyers who violate the conflict rules.
Where the conflict of interest is inadvertent, disqualification would serve no legiti-
mate regulatory function. These decisions reflect further the courts' recognition that
although the continued representation might violate the conflict rules, there is no sig-
nificant likelihood that interests protected by the rules would thereby be disserved,
because the rules themselves are overly protective. Thus, in these cases, disqualifica-
tion would serve no remedial purpose, either. This Article argues that even if the
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judiciary.99 At the same time, the personal sanction would promote
the integrity of the judicial proceeding by demonstrating, as graphi-
cally as a disqualification order, that the court will not condone viola-
tions of its rules of professional conduct.
While it remains to fill in the outlines of the process by which courts
would sanction lawyers personally for violating conflict rules in con-
nection with judicial proceedings, it seems clear that such a process
could be devised as an efficient alternative to employing disqualifica-
tion as a judicial sanction. The lawyer charged with an impermissible
conflict of interest would have to receive notice and a fair opportunity
to defend the challenged conduct, 1°° as would a lawyer accused of
abusing the judicial process in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 11.101 Upon finding that the lawyer violated the applicable
conflict rules, regardless of whether the court disqualified the lawyer,
the court would impose an appropriate sanction. Its ruling, like that
of a disciplinary committee or a district court imposing Rule 11 sanc-
tions, would be reviewable."° Because the process would be em-
ployed in tandem with the court's hearing on a disqualification
motion, it would be far more efficient than separate disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Given the choice between punishing lawyers by depriving
their clients of their continued services or punishing lawyers person-
ally, the latter is the preferable course if, as posited, it can be done
reasonably efficiently. In that event, disqualification should be em-
ployed exclusively for remedial purposes, not for enforcement
purposes.
No doubt, courts would hesitate to devise a process for disciplining
lawyers directly for a variety of reasons. One concern may be that the
norms governing conflicts of interest are, in many situations, too un-
lawyers' conduct in cases such as these is wrongful, disqualification is inappropriate
because the lawyers' clients are innocent.
99. For a well-publicized example of a court's imposition of direct sanctions on a
law firm as an alternative to disqualification, see In re Leslie Fay Cos., 175 B.R. 525,
539 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (imposing a monetary sanction of approximately $800,000
and precluding a firm from taking on new matters arising out of a case, when the firm
improperly represented debtors and interests adverse to debtors without disclosure to
court).
100. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980).
101. Because the lawyer's interest in defending himself would be consistent with
the lawyer's interest in defending the client's right to retain the lawyer, there would
be no conflict in simultaneously defending against a disciplinary sanction and repre-
senting the client in opposition to the disqualification motion.
102. Particularly in federal court, this would promote the effective development of
the law governing conflicts of interest. Presently, the law of some circuits, such as the
Second Circuit, has not developed since the 1980s because of the unavailability of
interlocutory appellate review of decisions regarding disqualification, see supra note
14, and the limited availability of review by way of mandamus. District courts in the
Second Circuit continue to apply a "taint" test that was announced in decisions more
than fifteen years ago but never refined or reconsidered in light of developments in
professional regulation. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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certain to fairly impose personal sanctions.103 A moment's reflection
should make clear, however, that in such situations, disqualifying the
lawyer as a sanction, rather than a remedy, for violating uncertain
norms would be even more unfair. Moreover, as courts impose sanc-
tions, the norms will become increasingly certain. Another concern
may be that direct sanctions are disproportionately harsh, given the
"technical" nature of the conflict rules. Yet, it would hardly be appro-
priate to place the primary hardship on innocent clients by denying
them counsel of choice in order to temper the hardship to the lawyer
who committed the wrong.
More weighty objections, however, might be raised from opposite
perspectives. From the perspective of a court seeking to preserve ju-
dicial resources, it might be argued that courts should avoid ancillary
litigation over the propriety of lawyer conduct that has no bearing on
the conduct of the case. From the perspective of a court concerned
about maximizing its role in enforcing conflict rules, it might be ar-
gued-recalling Wilkins's insight'01-that reducing the availability of
disqualification will discourage parties from calling violations of the
conflict rules to the court's attention. Neither argument should carry
the day, however.
a. Concern for the Preservation of Judicial Resources
From the Second Circuit's perspective, one might argue that sanc-
tioning lawyers personally will require courts to expend resources be-
yond those necessary to rule on whether disqualification is an
appropriate remedy. For example, a court might find, without resolv-
ing whether the lawyer violated the conflict rules, that there would be
no harm to remedy even if such a violation had occurred. In that
event, additional fact-finding and deliberation would be necessary to
determine whether the lawyer violated the rules and, if so, what sanc-
tion to impose-questions of no direct relevance to the parties in the
litigation. Why should a court take up these questions, rather than
referring them to the disciplinary authorities? After all, the greatest
obstacle to the effectiveness of disciplinary agencies-that litigators'
conflicts are not called to their attention-will have been removed
once the court refers the case. There are, however, at least three good
answers to this objection.
The first answer is that once a court is presented with a conflict
issue, it becomes more efficient for the court to determine the propri-
ety of the lawyer's conduct than for a disciplinary body to take up this
question separately. This question is entirely bound up with one that
the court must already decide-namely, whether to disqualify the law-
103. Cf. Wflldns, supra note 9, at 821 ("[E]nforcement officials will generally only
impose sanctions when a lawyer has clearly violated a relatively unambiguous profes-
sional norm.").
104. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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yer, not as a sanction, but as a remedy for engaging in an impermissi-
ble representation. In most cases, there will already be a complete, or
nearly complete, development of the relevant facts and the lawyer
charged with violating the conflict rules will have a fair opportunity to
wage a defense.
The second answer is that imposing sanctions enables courts, with
only a modest expenditure of resources, to clarify the meaning of the
applicable conflict rules and, where appropriate, to modify them. As
many have noted, the rules of professional conduct-conflict rules
among them-are highly general. In some contexts, they need to be
interpreted; in others, they do not work well. By addressing the ques-
tion of whether the lawyer properly undertook the representation, the
court will have the opportunity to clarify the meaning and reach of
conflict rules and, in procedural contexts where the rules are inade-
quate, to announce alternative rules.10 5
The third answer is that the personal sanction corrects two signifi-
cant problems with the practice in the Second Circuit of denying dis-
qualification in cases in which no remedy is necessary for the lawyer's
violation of a conflict rule. One problem is that lawyers might miscon-
strue a decision denying disqualification as an endorsement of the
lawyer's decision to undertake the representation. Particularly in the
federal system where different courts approach disqualification, and
lawyer ethics generally, in vastly inconsistent ways,'0 a lawyer cannot
be faulted for thinking that decisions denying disqualification motions
set the standard of conduct governing litigators' conduct from the very
outset of the representation, and not simply going forward from the
point mid-representation when the court issues its ruling.10 7 Coupling
a personal sanction with the denial of a disqualification motion would
make it clear that these two standards are different.
105. Presently, some courts use the disqualification decision to serve this function.
See, e.g., In re City Mattress, Inc., 163 B.R. 687 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994) (allowing
debtor's counsel to secure fees by receiving mortgage on real property in issue in
reorganization); cf In re Milford Group, Inc., 164 B.R. 899 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1993)
(allowing counsel to represent trustee on contingent fee basis).
106. See generally Eli J. Richardson, Demystifying the Federal Law of Attorney Eth-
ics, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 137 (1994) (pointing out the undesirable consequences of the fed-
eral courts' failure to form a "cohesive and efficient structure of ethical rules," and
advocating a reform of federal law of attorney ethics).
107. It is a common misconception that disqualification decisions set the standard
of conduct for litigators. The Reporters Notes to the conflict-of-interest provisions of
the draft Restatement cite disqualification decisions extensively. On occasion, bar
association ethics opinions providing advice to lawyers about whether their prospec-
tive conduct would entail an impermissible conflict of interest also cite disqualifica-
tion decisions, generally without regard to whether the decisions purported to set the
standard of conduct at the outset of the representation or whether they merely re-
flected a determination that disqualification was an unnecessary remedy. See, e.g.,
N.Y. St. B.A. Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 628 (1993) (relying on federal and state
decisions in concluding that an attorney may represent a client in a tort claim against
a restaurant that the attorney formerly represented in an unrelated matter).
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The other problem with the practice of denying motions for disqual-
ification for impermissible but harmless conflicts is that sophisticated
lawyers, aware that disciplinary agencies do not effectively enforce the
conflict rules, may conform their conduct to the standard reflected in
the judicial decisions even though they know that the more restrictive
conflict rules are meant to set the standard governing their conduct.
For example, in a case like Levin, a lawyer proposing to represent one
client against another might calculate that the risk of disqualification
is exceedingly low in a jurisdiction employing disqualification exclu-
sively as a remedy and that the risk of disciplinary proceedings is
equally low. The lawyer might decide to accept these risks and under-
take the representation knowing that it is flatly forbidden by the con-
flict rules. The prospect of a substantial personal sanction imposed by
the court in the litigation raises the stakes considerably. Even if
courts imposed modest sanctions the first time litigators violated the
conflict rules, they could be expected to impose increasingly severe
sanctions on subsequent occasions, thus greatly reducing the incentive
for violating the rules in contexts where disqualification is unlikely.
b. Concern for Maximizing the Courts' Enforcement Role
From the Fifth Circuit's perspective, one might argue that imposing
personal sanctions ancillary to ruling on disqualification motions will
be an ineffective mode of regulation, because the limited availability
of disqualification will greatly discourage parties from filing disqualifi-
cation motions in many cases in which an adversary's lawyer clearly
violated the conflict rules. The concern is almost certainly overstated,
however. A court might take either of two approaches to the imposi-
tion of personal sanctions for violating conflicts rules. Under either
approach, many motions would still be filed because disqualification
would remain available to remedy the harms against which the con-
ffict rules protect. While some percentage of conflicts violations will
not be brought to the courts' attention when once they would have
been, the percentage will depend on which of two approaches are
adopted and, in either case, will probably be small.
A court seeking a narrow enforcement role would provide that par-
ties seeking to disqualify their adversary's lawyer must make a colora-
ble claim that disqualification is necessary to remedy harms resulting
from the violation of a conflict rule. The court would make a personal
sanction available whether or not it was ultimately determined that
disqualification was an inappropriate remedy. 08 Under this ap-
108. It would be inappropriate to regard disqualification as one aspect of the sanc-
tion, and therefore to take account of the fact of disqualification as justification for
mitigating the severity of the personal sanction. Doing so would create an incentive
for lawyers defending against both a disqualification motion and a motion for per-
sonal sanctions to argue less vigorously against disqualification as a remedy in order
to promote their own disciplinary interests.
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proach, disqualification motions would not be filed in cases in which
there was a conflict violation but no conceivable harm. But this will
describe few of the cases in which disqualification motions were previ-
ously granted. In most cases in which a lawyer engages in an imper-
missible conflict of interest, a nonfrivolous claim can be made that
some harm will result.
Disqualification motions might also be filed less frequently in cases
in which some harm can be alleged but it seems unlikely that there is
sufficient harm to justify disqualifying counsel as a remedy. As a prac-
tical matter, however, this will also describe few cases, both because
the relevant standard will be so ad hoc and discretionary, as will be
discussed later, and because the relevant facts will be subject to dis-
pute. Further, as the proliferation of Rule 11 motions' 09-at least
prior to recent amendments to the rule-suggests," 0 parties may be
more than willing to file colorable, but nonmeritorious disqualification
motions because of the prospect that personal sanctions will be im-
posed against opposing counsel. Finally, to the extent that somewhat
fewer challenges are brought on the basis of conflicts of interest, it is
unclear why courts should care. Courts already address only a limited
number of conflicts that arise in litigation; as noted earlier, many
evade review."' It is unclear why courts have a special interest in en-
couraging ancillary litigation over whether lawyers should be sanc-
tioned for violations of conflict rules that are essentially harmless.
A court, like the Fifth Circuit, seeking the broadest enforcement
role, would allow parties to obtain monetary sanctions against lawyers
who violate the conflict rules even when there is no colorable basis for
a disqualification motion. If this approach were taken, there might be
virtually no shortfall in motions. At present, the ordinary motives for
filing a disqualification motion for conflict violations that clearly re-
quire no remedy would seem to be either to exact revenge or to gain a
tactical advantage."12 While the prospect of monetary sanctions might
seem less appealing than disqualification from either perspective, it
probably offers enough of an incentive.
109. See generally Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions: Case Law Perspectives
and Preventive Measures (1991) (explaining that the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 has
given federal courts greater opportunity to evaluate lawyer performance); Lawrence
M. Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance: Rethinking
Rule 11, 32 Vill. L. Rev. 575 (1987) (same); Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor
Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41
Hastings Li. 383 (1990) (same).
110. The judicial responsibility for imposing personal sanctions on lawyers who vio-
late conflict rules in connection with an ongoing litigation is entirely consistent with
practice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. If satellite litigation is justified
under Rule 11, it is more clearly justified with respect to conflicts of interest because
the sanction question will be interrelated with the disqualification question that must
be resolved, rather than entirely ancillary as it often is under Rule 11.
111. See supra text accompanying note 15.
112. See Lindgren, supra note 40, at 440-41.
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III. JUDICIAL LAWMAKING: DISQUALIFICATION AS A REMEDY
Assume that the court in Levin had no interest in sanctioning Car-
penter, Bennett for representing Levin Computer Corp. against IBM
in violation of the applicable conflict rule. This might be because,
contrary to Wilkins's teaching, the disciplinary mechanism works ide-
ally and comprehensively and any additional judicial sanction would
therefore be unnecessary either to punish the law firm or to deter
other law firms from violating the applicable conflict rule. Alterna-
tively, this might be because disqualification is an inappropriate sanc-
tion for a lawyer's violation of a conflict rule, as argued in part II.B.
In either event, a court must decide what legal framework to employ
in ruling on the disqualification motion. The answer depends in part
on how the court conceives the applicable conflict rule. This part ar-
gues that because the conflict rules are prophylactic rules, a violation
does not necessarily cause harm that must be remedied by removing
the lawyer from the representation. Consequently, the conflict rules
should not serve as the appropriate standard for deciding disqualifica-
tion motions. Nor is it likely that other, less restrictive rules would
provide an adequate substitute. Courts should eschew rules in favor
of case-by-case application of an open-textured standard which should
be narrowly tailored to the harms that conflicts of interest cause,
while, at the same time, giving weight to the countervailing harms
caused by depriving a litigant of chosen counsel after the representa-
tion is under way.
A. Disqualification as a Per Se Remedy
This section considers and rejects two arguments for affording dis-
qualification as a remedy in every case in which a party's lawyer un-
dertook the representation in violation of the conflict rules. The first
argument is that undertaking an impermissible conflict of interest vio-
lates a client's right and that disqualification must invariably be af-
forded as an equitable remedy.113 The second argument is that
impermissible conflicts invariably threaten harm that must be averted
by disqualification.
1. Conflict Rules as Enforceable Rights
The conflict rules, promulgated by courts based on the ABA mod-
els, are rooted in common law principles that are more than a century
old." 4 A client or former client moving for disqualification might
113. See Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding that dis-
qualification is equitable in nature).
114. See, eg., Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U.S. 494, 502 (1879) (holding that a lawyer
engaged in constructive fraud by switching sides in a matter); Manning v. Hayden, 16
F. Cas. 645, 653 (D. Or. 1879) (stating that an attorney who purchased land for him-
self from his client put his duty to the client in conflict with his interest as the pur-
chaser to the detriment of his client and must account to the client as a trustee).
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therefore argue that the lawyer's conflict of interest violates a com-
mon law right that either exists independently of the conflict rule vio-
lated by the lawyer or is codified by the applicable rule." 5 In either
case, the right is violated without regard to whether, as a consequence
of the conflict of interest, the quality of representation suffers, the
lawyers breaches a confidence, or some other legal interests protected
by the conflict rule are impaired." 6 Further, disqualification should
be available as a form of injunctive relief,1 7 rather then relegating the
aggrieved client to a separate lawsuit for monetary damages. For ex-
ample, if IBM has a "right" not to be opposed by Carpenter, Bennett,
then the court should disqualify the law firm as the most effective
means of enforcing the right. Wholly apart from whether it is an ap-
propriate sanction, disqualification is per se a remedy for an impermis-
sible conflict, at least when the disqualification is sought by someone
who can claim to be under the protection of the applicable conflict
rule." 8
Insofar as this argument rests on the conflict rules themselves rather
than on the underlying common law principles, it fails for two reasons.
First, the weight of judicial authority favors the view that disciplinary
provisions such as the conflict rules do not provide an independent
basis for civil liability," 9 although they may be relevant in defining the
115. Stated somewhat differently, disqualification should be afforded to enforce the
lawyer's fiduciary duty to refrain from conflicts of interest-a duty that either co-
exists with, or is embodied in, the conflict rules.
116. The Ninth Circuit recently took this view of Idaho's former-client disqualifica-
tion rule. See Damron v. Herzog, 67 F.3d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1995) (violating former-
client disqualification rule may be basis of malpractice action under Idaho law, even
absent use or disclosure of client confidences). Presumably, however, whether the
lawyer provided substandard representation or breached a confidence would be rele-
vant to the question of damages. Cf. Tinms v. Rosenblum, 713 F. Supp. 948, 954
(E.D. Va. 1989) (disallowing recovery for emotional distress caused by loss of child
custody as a result of lawyer's negligence), affd, 900 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1990); Sup-
pressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 105-06 (Ill. App. 1990) (denying compensation
for client's mental anguish caused by lawyer's breach of fiduciary duty in making sex-
ual advances). But see Cummings v. Pinder, 574 A.2d 843, 845 (Del. 1990) (allowing
damages for emotional distress); Salley v. Childs, 541 A.2d 1297, 1300 nn.2&4 (Me.
1988) (same).
117. See Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1286
(Pa. 1992).
118. Cf. Peck v. Meda-Care Ambulance Corp., 457 N.W.2d 538, 542-43 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that violating the advocate-witness rule did not breach a duty
owed to the client).
119. See, e.g., Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Mass. 1986) ("A violation
of a... disciplinary rule is not itself [a] breach of duty to a client."); Lazy Seven Coal
Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, P.C., 813 S.W.2d 400, 407 (Tenn. 1991) (stating that
violating codes of conduct is not conclusively a breach of duty); Hizey v. Carpenter,
830 P.2d 646, 654 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (holding that jury may not be informed of
ethical rules in determining legal malpractice). But see Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F.
Supp. 666, 679 (D.D.C. 1989) (stating that although it does not expressly provide a
basis for a civil action, the Model Code nonetheless "may be considered to define the
minimum level of professional conduct required of an attorney, such that a violation
of one of the DRs is conclusive evidence of a breach of the attorney's common law
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scope of a lawyer's obligations in a malpractice action. 120 Thus, a cli-
ent whose lawyer had a conflict of interest may bring an action for
malpractice or breach of a fiduciary duty,'' but not for violating a
conflict rule per se.
Second, and more importantly, the conflict rules are judicially
promulgated and may therefore be superseded by other court-estab-
lished standards of conduct or by preemptive judicial rulings."2 As
noted earlier, a court may determine that an otherwise applicable con-
flict rule is unduly restrictive and therefore does not set an appropri-
ate legal standard with respect to the question of whether the lawyer
may properly remain in the representation. 23 This judicial determi-
nation means that a lawyer has no obligation to withdraw from the
representation and, hence, there is no ongoing obligation to be en-
forced by means of disqualification.
If the argument for disqualification as a per se remedy rests on a
preexisting common law right, it is more difficult to dismiss. One pos-
sible answer is that even if the movant has a legally enforceable com-
mon-law right, it does not necessarily follow that disqualification is an
fiduciary obligations."); Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163, 167 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
("[A]s with statutes, a violation of the Code is rebuttable evidence of malpractice.").
For commentary addressing this issue, see Robert Dahlquist, The Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility and Civil Damage Actions Against Attorneys, 9 Ohio N.U. L.
Rev. 1 (1982); Jean E. Faure & R. Keith Strong, The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct No Standard for Malpractice, 47 Mont. L. Rev. 363 (1986); Charles W. Wolf-
ram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in
Civil Litigation, 30 S.C. L. Rev. 281 (1979); Michael J. Benjamin, Note, The Rules of
Professional Conduct Basis for Civil Liability of Attorneys, 39 U. Fla. L Rev. 777
(1987).
120. See e.g., Miami Int'l Realty Co. v. Paynter, 841 F.2d 348, 353 (10th Cir. 1988)
(holding that although the Model Code is admissible in malpractice suit to show stan-
dard for attorneys, it has no force and effect of law); Fisunan, 487 N.E.2d at 1381
(finding a violation of a disciplinary rule may be evidence of attorney negligence);
Lazy Seven Coal Sales, 813 S.W.2d at 405 (noting that the Model Code provides gui-
dance in ascertaining a lawyer's obligations and constitutes evidence of standards of
conduct). See generally Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F. McLaughlin, The Use of
Expert Witnesses in Establishing Liability in Legal Malpractice Cases, 61 Temp. L
Rev. 1351, 1360-62 (1988) (noting that the Model Rules do not provide an independ-
ent cause of action, but can be used to show malpractice).
121. Cf Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 543 (2d Cir.
1994) (involving a law firm's breach of fiduciary duty by assisting client in business
transaction about which it had previously counseled another client).
122. Cf. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1407, 1414
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that the Supremacy Clause supersedes state rules regarding
attorney conduct); Sullivan v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 551 P.2d 531, 534 (Alaska 1976)
(stating that court has inherent authority to depart from rules governing admission to
practice law). Professor Penegar's history of judicial disqualification decisions sug-
gests that, at least initially, a disqualification order was not viewed as a personal rem-
edy for the violation of a party's right. Rather, a disqualification order was issued
pursuant to a court's supervisory authority over the practice of law and over judicial
proceedings in order to enforce judicially established standards of conduct. See Pene-
gar, supra note 43, at 837-55.
123. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
1996]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
appropriate equitable remedy, given the represented litigant's coun-
tervailing right to the lawyer's services.'2 4 For example, presumably
Levin Computer Corp. had an enforceable contractual right to Car-
penter, Bennett's services. Although Carpenter, Bennett might argue
that its contractual obligation is implicitly qualified by its right to with-
draw from the representation to avoid a conflict of interest, 25 the firm
might well be liable for breach of contract where, as in Levin, the
conflict was not of the client's making and was known to the firm, but
not the client, at the outset of the representation. It is by no means
clear that, to enforce Carpenter, Bennett's fiduciary obligations to
IBM, a court should compel the firm to breach its contractual duty to
Levin, rather than requiring IBM to seek monetary damages.
Concededly, however, this is not an entirely satisfactory answer for
two reasons. First, to the extent that the ongoing conflict should be
remedied at all, the most effective remedy will be disqualification.
Few clients can afford malpractice lawsuits even where there is a pros-
pect of a significant recovery; fewer still would commence a suit
where, by hypothesis, the lawyer's wrongdoing was probably harmless.
This concern may be offset by the recognition that disqualification will
give rise to a cause of action on behalf of the client who would lose the
lawyer's services that is no more realistically enforceable.
Second, insofar as the lawyer has a duty-even if unenforceable by
disqualification-to withdraw from the representation, the lawyer in-
curs an additional conflict of interest by remaining in the representa-
tion.2 6 The lawyer faces the possibility of a civil action premised in
part on the lawyer's acts after the disqualification motion was denied.
The lawyer's pecuniary and professional interest in minimizing liabil-
ity based on the ongoing representation conflicts with the client's in-
terest in prevailing in the lawsuit. The saving grace may be that
because the likelihood of a civil action against the lawyer is so remote,
a reasonable lawyer should feel little compulsion to subordinate the
litigant's interests to his own. 127
124. See, eg., Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736, 737 (2d Cir. 1927) (stating
that a court considering whether to grant injunctive relief should balance "the com-
parative hardships of the continued wrong and the injunction"). See generally David
S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the
Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 627, 655 (1988) (arguing that "a
suit for an injunction without balancing the equities would present a rare instance of
the judicial process without a safety valve").
125. Cf. Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.16(a)(1) (stating that a lawyer must seek
to withdraw from the representation if "the representation will result in violation of
the rules of professional conduct").
126. Cf. Lindgren, supra note 40, at 432-33 (stating that a new conflict of interest
between a lawyer and her client emerges when opposing counsel raises the prospect
of a conflict of interest, because counsel's incentive to clear her name may conflict
with her incentive to promote her client's interests).
127. Moreover, the remote possibility that the client in the litigation will bring a
malpractice action if the lawyer represents it poorly may counterbalance the incentive
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A better answer to the argument that disqualification should be a
per se remedy for violations of the common law right is that ethics
rules and judicial rulings supersede the common law rights insofar as
they authorize lawyers to engage in particular conduct. Therefore, an
otherwise applicable common law principle making a particular con-
flict of interest impermissible should be limited by a judicial determi-
nation in the disqualification setting to the effect that the lawyer may
properly continue the representation." The lawyer who complies
with the judicially established standard need not worry about the re-
lated common law obligations. Recognizing that a judicial order de-
nying a disqualification motion has the effect of superseding the
otherwise applicable common law obligation as well as the otherwise
applicable conflict rule would also avoid the conflict of interest posed
by the prospect of a later civil action against the lawyer.
As a matter of sound regulation, this seems to be an appropriate
way to understand the interplay between the ethics rules and judicial
standards on one hand, and the common law principles on the other.
Presently, litigators look to the conflict rules and disqualification deci-
sions, and not to the sparse common-law case law, to determine their
obligations vis-A-vis conflicts of interest. In the interest of effective
regulation, courts should be authorized to modify outmoded common
law doctrine regarding lawyers' conflicts of interest. If a court con-
cludes that disqualifying a lawyer in the course of litigation would
serve no meaningful purpose and would cause various countervailing
harms to the represented litigant, the only way to give effect to this
judgment would be to hold that, although the lawyer may have had an
enforceable obligation not to undertake the representation in the first
place, he has no enforceable obligation to withdraw from the
representation.
The question remains, however, whether courts have authority to
make ethics law that trumps the common law in this manner. This
authority may be rooted in the courts' inherent power to regulate the
bar,12 9 their power to develop the common law, or a combination of
the two. This Article assumes that courts do have power to promul-
gate rules or issue ad hoc rulings that restrict or refine lawyers' com-
mon law obligations, while acknowledging that the question may be
worthy of further consideration.
to render inadequate representation to avoid the equally remote possibility of a civil
lawsuit by the other client.
128. As a legal matter, a judicial determination that a lawyer may continue the
representation would almost self-evidently foreclose a malpractice claim founded on
negligence. It is less clear that as a legal matter compliance with judicial standards
would foreclose a claim founded on contract or agency principles. See generally Roy
Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Pri-
mer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. Rev. 235 (1994) (arguing that courts
should establish a consistent set of rules when classifying legal malpractice).
129. For commentary addressing this source of judicial authority, see supra note 18.
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2. Impermissible Representation as Harmful Per Se
One might also conceive of the conflict rules as defining conduct
that is harmful per se, rather than as defining conduct that poses an
unacceptable risk of harm.130 If IBM is necessarily harmed by its law
firm's representation of an adversary, wholly apart from how that rep-
resentation appears to affect IBM, then a court could not allow the
representation to continue without appearing to countenance ongoing
harm to a client in a matter within its jurisdiction.
This Article takes as a further premise, however, that the conflict of
interest rules are prophylactic rules and that in this respect, as Ted
Schneyer has observed, they are unlike most disciplinary rules.131
They do not proscribe conduct that is necessarily harmful in itself, but
protect against the occurrence of various harms. 32 Some are tangible,
such as breaching client confidentiality or rendering substandard rep-
resentation, and others are intangible, such as engendering a feeling of
betrayal on the part of the client. Conflict rules avert these harms by
forbidding the representation under circumstances giving rise to an
unreasonably high risk that such harms will occur.' 33 In doing so, the
conflict rules impose costs not only on lawyers who are deprived of
130. Cf. Earl Scheib, Inc. v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 386, 390 (1967) (holding
that injury to former client is presumed when an attorney represents conflicting
interests).
131. See Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L
Crisis Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 639, 644 (1994).
132. See McMunigal, supra note 7, at 834 (positing that conflict of interest doctrine
is based on the assumption that something is needed to protect the judicial process
from the threat of impairment).
133. See, e.g., Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 209 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996) (requiring consent before permitting an attorney to represent two
or more clients in civil litigation when there is a "substantial risk" that the attorney's
representation of one of the clients would be materially adversely affected by the
attorney's duties to the other client[s]); McMunigal, supra note 7, at 839 (explaining
the "risk avoidance approach" to conflict of interest rules).
In some cases, a risk of harm will be acceptable, not because the risk is slight, but
because the countervailing benefits of undertaking the representation are substantial.
For example, lawyers generally may not acquire a proprietary interest in a client's
cause of action, in part because of the conflict between the lawyer's interests and
those of the client that thereby arises. An exception is made, however, for attorneys
representing civil litigants on a contingent fee basis because of the social utility of this
practice. See, e.g., Model Rules, supra note 1, Rules 1.5, 1.8(j) (1993) (setting forth
contingent fee regulations). See generally Stewart Jay, The Dilemmas of Attorney
Contingent Fees, 2 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 813 (1989) (arguing that contingent fee con-
tracts that calculate the fee as a percentage of the recovery present sufficiently serious
possibilities of abuse of the attorney-client relationship to warrant elimination by reg-
ulation); Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 Colum. L. Rev.
595 (1993) (discussing issues raised by the ban on contingent fees in criminal cases
and suggesting a partial step back from the prohibition). Similarly, as Professor
McMunigal has pointed out, lawyers for civil rights defendants have been permitted
to condition settlement offers on waivers of attorneys' fees by the plaintiffs' lawyers,
even though the offers give rise to substantial conflicts between the interests of the
plaintiffs and their lawyers. See McMunigal, supra note 7, at 865-68.
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business but also on clients who are denied their choice of counsel in
contexts where no harm would in fact occur"M or where clients would
willingly accept the risk that harm will occur. Nonetheless, such rules
may be justified by various considerations, among them the difficulty
of predicting whether the lawyer's work will in fact be impaired as the
representation progresses. 35
Thus, returning to the Levin case, there is nothing harmful per se in
representing one client against another. Rather, in enjoining a lawyer
from doing so without client consent, the conflict rule aims to prevent
harms that are likely to occur in this category of cases. For example,
there is a risk that the lawyer may represent one client less zealously
out of loyalty to the other or may misuse one client's confidences to
benefit the other. Even more likely, the representation of one client
against another may lead a client to feel betrayed. 136 This, most be-
lieve, would be bad in itself and would potentially undermine the at-
torney-client relationship to the detriment of the quality of
representation.' 37
In this category of cases, the lawyer's obligation to obtain client
consent before undertaking the representation, even when the lawyer
is personally convinced that both clients can be adequately repre-
sented, serves at least two functions. First, by consenting to the repre-
sentation, the client assumes the risk that the lawyer erred in
predicting that the lawyer's representation of the new client will not
disadvantage the existing client. Additionally, the act of seeking client
consent provides some assurance to the existing client that the lawyer
134. Many examples may be found in criminal cases involving conflicts of interest.
In order to secure a new trial based on trial counsel's conflict, a convicted defendant
must show that the lawyer had an actual conflict that impaired the quality of the
representation. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-49 (1980). Defendants are
rarely able to meet this standard, even in cases where the lawyer violated the applica-
ble rules of professional conduct.
135. Among the possibilities is that in seeking to avoid one set of harms, lawyers
will engage in overly cautious conduct that itself undermines a client's interests.
136. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct strongly endorse the principle ap-
plied in Levin. The rules provide that in the ordinary case, even with client consent,
"a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other
matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated." Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule
1.7 cmt. While recognizing that there may be an exception where the lawyer "repre-
sent[s] an enterprise with diverse operations," a lawyer seeking employment as an
advocate against such an enterprise would require the consent of both clients before
doing so. Id. This principle is also embodied in the draft Restatement. See infra note
189 and accompanying text; see also Ethics Conference Speakers Take Controversial
Positions, 12 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Prof. Conduct 73, 86-87 (Mar. 20, 1996)
(opposing Professor Thomas Morgan's suggestion for liberalizing the rule against su-
ing current clients). But see Steven C. Krane, Re-evaluating Expectations in the Attor-
ney-Client Relationship, 1994 The Prof. Law. 7, 15 (suggesting that Rules should allow
representation adverse to client interest unless there would be "some palpable detri-
mental impact" on the lawyer's professional judgment).
137. Professor Crystal refers to this problem as "the risk of disharmony." Crystal,
supra note 42, at 293-94.
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takes the obligations to that client seriously and enables the client to
determine whether, subjectively, it will nonetheless perceive the rep-
resentation of its adversary as an act of disloyalty. By consenting, if it
chooses to do so, the client confirms that it will not feel betrayed.138
But the consequence of requiring informed consent before represent-
ing one client in an action against another is that some litigants will be
denied counsel of choice in cases in which the harms against which the
rule protects would not materialize. This would be true in some cases
in which the existing client withholds consent exclusively for tactical
reasons, without any genuine concern about the effect of the conflict
on the representation. 39 It would also be true in some cases in which
one client or the other lacks capacity to consent to the conflict.' 40
If, as posited here, the conflict-of-interest rules are judicially-con-
structed prophylactic rules, the dispositive question for the court
should be whether disqualifying the lawyer in the particular case is
justified in order to remedy a past harm or avert a future one. Thus,
in Levin, unless disqualification would redress or avert some harm to
IBM, disqualification would be an inappropriate remedy.14 ' It would
serve no legitimate purpose while creating a variety of other harms.
These harms include delaying the litigation, depriving Levin Com-
138. The conflict rules require client consent even where one might objectively con-
clude that it is obvious that the conflict of interest poses no practical risk. The low
threshold might be justified on the ground that regardless of the lawyer's conclusion,
this is information that a client ordinarily should be provided in order to make an
informed decision regarding the representation that is entrusted to the client, namely,
the decision of whom to retain as counsel. Cf Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.4(b)
("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation."). The low threshold
is problematic, however, in situations in which the client is incapable of giving in-
formed consent, for example, where the client is incapacitated or, under traditional
doctrine, where the client is a government agency.
139. In some cases, the advantage may be to deprive the adversary of one good
lawyer among many, of a lawyer in whom the adversary reposes particular confidence
because of past dealings, or of a lawyer who can proceed with particular efficiency
because of prior familiarity with the adversary's business. In other cases, the advan-
tage may be considerably greater. Consider a case in which a lawyer already repre-
senting the plaintiff in pending litigation against several defendants identifies another
possible defendant who turns out to be a client in an unrelated matter. If consent is
withheld, the plaintiff may decide to forego adding the additional defendant rather
than retaining a new lawyer.
140. On the general question of decision-making in representation of incapacitated
clients, see Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Client's Competence in
Context, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1473, 1474 n.4 (1996); Peter Margulies, Access, Connec-
tion, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing Senior Citizens of Questiona-
ble Capacity, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1073 (1994); Jan Ellen Rein, Clients With
Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices-What's an Attorney to Do?: Within and
Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1101 (1994).
141. Cf Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976)
("Where the relationship is a continuing one, adverse representation is prima facie
improper,... and the attorney must be prepared to show, at the very least, that there
will be no actual or apparent conflict in loyalties or diminution in the vigor of his
representation.").
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puter Corp. of its chosen counsel, and forcing Levin Computer Corp.
to incur the expense of retaining a new lawyer who is unfamiliar with
the litigation.
If IBM had been harmed by Carpenter, Bennett's representation of
its adversary in a manner that the conflict rule is designed to avoid
and disqualification would have remedied, or if Carpenter Bennett's
continued representation of Levin Computer Corp. could have been
expected to cause such a harm as the litigation proceeded, disqualifi-
cation might have been appropriate. However, even if disqualification
might in fact have redressed or avoided some harm to IBM, disqualifi-
cation would not have been justified unless the harm to be redressed
or avoided was greater than the harm caused by disqualification itself.
If one assumes, as discussed above, that the second client is no more
guilty than the first, then there is no reason in fairness why the burden
of the lawyer's misconduct should invariably fall on the second."' In
a case like Levin, one client will be burdened-IBM if the motion is
denied; Levin Computer Corp. if the motion is granted. 43 If the sec-
ond client could no more be expected to prevent the lawyer's miscon-
duct than the first, the appropriate question should be who will be
harmed less-BM if the firm continues to represent its adversary, or
Levin Computer Corp. if the firm is disqualified. The relevant harms
are not necessarily reciprocal, as the Levin case illustrates.'"
In Levin, as viewed from the perspective of the court in 1977, it
seems highly unlikely that disqualification would have served to re-
dress any past harm. The ordinary harm to be redressed by disqualifi-
cation is the misuse of client confidences. If it were reasonably likely
that Carpenter, Bennett received information in the course of repre-
senting IBM in labor matters and used that information to benefit
Levin Computer Corp. in the antitrust action, disqualifying the law
firm and depriving successor counsel of work product containing
IBM's confidential information might have afforded some measure of
142. Cf. Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1127
(N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that where merger of law firms resulted in firm's represen-
tation of one client against another, the appropriate remedy was not disqualification,
but for the firm to choose which client to withdraw from representing); Crystal. supra
note 42, at 297 ("As between two innocent clients, it seems more appropriate to con-
sider the respective interests of those clients rather than reflexively favoring the inter-
ests of one client over the other.").
143. While it is true that the sins of the lawyer are often visited on their clients in
the form of procedural penalties for their lawyers' lapses, the conditions that ordina-
rily justify such penalties-e.g., sanctions for failing to comply with timing require-
ments-are not present in the disqualification context. Ordinarily, the penalty
protects an innocent third party at the expense of the lawyer's client. Here, both are
clients. The question is which client to burden.
144. See Crystal, supra note 42, at 297 ("On the facts of the Levin case, for exam-




redress. 4 5 Given the unrelated natures of the labor matters and the
antitrust action, however, there was no reason to believe that confi-
dences had been or would be misused.
Nor was there an indication of any other tangible harm to IBM that
could be redressed by disqualification. For example, in the unlikely
event that the firm had represented IBM inadequately in the labor
matters and the inadequacies could somehow be attributed to the
firm's representation of Levin Computer Corp., disqualification would
not provide any meaningful remedy. A malpractice action, on the
other hand, would more appropriately enable IBM to remedy this
problem. Even to the extent that IBM previously felt "betrayed" by
the firm's representation of an adversary, disqualification would not
cure the corporation's past "hurt feelings."
Similarly, from the court's perspective in 1977, it seems unlikely
that disqualification would have been necessary to avert any future
harm to IBM. By the time of the court's ruling, IBM had discharged
Carpenter, Bennett as its counsel in labor matters. Thus, IBM was
only a former client and the firm's only remaining duty to IBM was to
preserve its confidences. As the prevailing conflict rules reflect, 46 the
firm could ordinarily be expected to represent Levin Computer Corp.
adequately while preserving IBM's confidences because of the lack of
any relationship between the representation of IBM in labor matters
and the representation of IBM's adversary in an antitrust action. 147
Thus, as a consequence of changed circumstances-IBM's discharge
of Carpenter, Bennett-the conflict rules themselves would not re-
145. Generally, courts allow disqualified lawyers to provide their work product to
their successors, at least absent a showing that identifiable items contained, or were
impermissibly based on, another client's confidential information. See, e.g., First Wis.
Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 211 (7th Cir. 1978) (directing former
counsel to turn over work product because there would be no improper advantage);
IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 275, 283 (holding that ordering the turning over of work
product to substitute counsel did not abuse the court's discretion under the
circumstances).
146. See, e.g., Model Rules, supra note 1, Rule 1.9(a) (permitting law firm to under-
take new representation adverse to a former client where the new representation is
unrelated to the former representation).
147. As the foregoing discussion reflects, this Article adopts Professor Crystal's ap-
proach, see Crystal, supra note 42, which is in some ways more restrictive and in other
ways more permissive than the Second Circuit's "taint" analysis, and which was en-
dorsed by Professor Lingren in his article on disqualification for conflicts of interest.
See Lindgren, supra note 40. It is more permissive in the sense that it would counte-
nance some risk of "taint"-i.e., adverse consequences in the pending litigation-
where the risks are acceptable in light of the greater harm that might be caused by
disqualification. See Crystal, supra note 42, at 310 ("[C]ourts should focus precisely on
a balance of the prospective benefits and costs."). It is more restrictive in the sense
that it examines harms occurring outside the litigation-e.g., to clients represented on
unrelated transactional matters. See id. at 310, 313 (focusing on the risk either of trial
taint in the adversity matter or disharmony in the nonadversity matter from continued
misrepresentation).
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quire disqualification if applied from the point when the motion was
decided."4
B. Developing an Independent Standard of Conduct to Judge the
Propriety of Continued Representation
Suppose that in Levin, IBM had not discharged Carpenter, Bennett.
In that event, not only would the representation have been improper
from the outset, but the ongoing representation would also have been
improper under the conflict rules, which make no allowances for con-
flicts which first arise or are first discovered mid-representation. The
underlying premise of the conflict rules is that, where the representa-
tion is forbidden by such a rule, undertaking the representation poses
a risk of harming one or more clients and, at least absent client con-
sent, this risk is unacceptable. One might take the view that in decid-
ing whether disqualification is a necessary remedy, courts should defer
to the judgments underlying the conflict rules so that if a conflict rule
would forbid the ongoing representation, a court should do so as well.
Rejecting this view, this section argues, first, that the framework for
deciding disqualification motions should be independent of the con-
flict rules and, second, that the framework should involve application
of an ad hoc standard, rather than an alternative set of rules.
1. The Inadequacy of the Conflict Rules
To determine whether disqualification is a necessary remedy, a
court might employ the conflict rules, just as a law firm would do if it
were determining the propriety of the ongoing representation for it-
self. Thus, in Levin, the court would look to the conflict rules to de-
148. As Professor Crystal explains, a law firm should often be able to avoid disqual-
ification by withdrawing from the representation of one of two clients who are adver-
saries. It does not follow, however, that a law firm acts properly by doing so
unilaterally. See Crystal, supra note 42, at 294-95, 310. For example, a law firm may
not knowingly undertake a new representation with the intention of withdrawing
from an ongoing representation with which the new one will conflict. See Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers § 213 cmt. c. (Proposed Final Draft No. 1. 1996). By
the same token, if the law firm withdraws from representing the client that has the
stronger claim to the lawyer's continued services, the withdrawal should compound
the impropriety in initially undertaking the representation of conflicting interests. In-
deed, it might be argued that, absent client consent to its withdrawal, a law firm
should never unilaterally withdraw from representing one client in order to represent
another. By doing so, the law firm deprives the client of an opportunity for a disinter-
ested, judicial determination as to which client has the stronger claim to the lawyer's
services.
On the other hand, the possibility of withdrawal with client consent, as a way of
avoiding disqualification, provides the possibility of a private resolution. The law firm
may offer one client or the other an inducement for client consent-e.g., the return of
fees already expended on the representation. Attempting to negotiate for client con-
sent, however, might simply compound the lawyer's conflict of interest. Further,
withdrawing from the representation would not prevent the possibility of sanctions
for having improperly undertaken conflicting representations in the first place.
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cide whether Carpenter, Bennett's representation of Levin Computer
Corp. would irreconcilably conflict with its representation of IBM
and, if so, whether Carpenter, Bennett must refrain from representing
both clients to avoid the attendant harms that are likely to result.149
The applicable rule would be the one already discussed, namely, that
without client consent, a lawyer may not represent a party in a lawsuit
against an existing client even if the lawyer is convinced that doing so
will not prejudice the existing client's representation. Therefore, if the
court were to apply the conflict rules, it would be constrained to dis-
qualify the firm, even if it were convinced, on this set of facts, either
that there was no reasonable possibility that the representation of
IBM would be adversely affected or that any harm to IBM's represen-
tation would be vastly outweighed by the harm to Levin Computer
Corp. from the loss of its original counsel.
As a general rule, courts should accept the judgments underlying
the conflict rules. To the extent that courts believe these rules do not
appropriately resolve the general class of cases, courts should change
or refine them.15 0 Even so, it does not follow that a court should ap-
ply the conflict rules to the disqualification decision. It would be en-
tirely consistent with the judgments underlying the conflict rules for
courts deciding disqualification motions to engage in an independent
determination of whether, on the facts before it, the harms likely to
occur if the representation continues outweigh the harms likely to oc-
cur if the law firm is disqualified. That is because the conflict rules are
based on two premises that are inapplicable in the disqualification set-
ting and that cause them to be unduly restrictive as applied in this
setting.
First, the conflict rules are based on the expectation that they will
ordinarily be applied before the lawyer accepts the representation.
Based on the paradigm of a lawyer and client addressing the conflict
issue at the very outset of the proposed representation, the rules strike
a balance between the interest in counsel of choice and the interest in
avoiding harms that may be caused by a conflict of interest. At this
point, the cost of depriving the client of the particular preferred law-
yer is generally low. This generalization will not always be appropri-
ate, because the particular lawyer may have unusual expertise,
because the client has a long-term relationship with that lawyer, or
149. Some courts employ explicitly the Model Rules as the standards governing
disqualification decisions. See, e.g., Host Marriot Corp. v. Fast Food Operators, Inc.,
891 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (D.N.J. 1995) (applying New Jersey Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 1.9(a)(1) in determining whether an attorney should be disqualified).
See generally Richardson, supra note 106, at 152-56 (discussing local courts' adoption
of the Model Rules to govern attorney conduct and how they conflict with existing
local rules).
150. For example, if courts believe that screening is a generally acceptable solution
to the problem of vicarious disqualification for certain types of conflicts, courts should
promulgate rules that permit screening.
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because the particular lawyer is most affordable.15' Nonetheless, in
the interest of clear line-drawing, the conflict rules apply in these situ-
ations as well.
In contrast, disqualification motions almost invariably are filed after
the representation has commenced, and sometimes, as in Levin, long
after. Although the conflict rules apply when a conflict is addressed
mid-representation, as well as at the outset,1' they do not adequately
account for the interests of both the client and the court that are gen-
erally implicated at this stage. Clients have a much greater stake in
retaining lawyers who have already performed work on the particular
matter than in retaining a particular lawyer before work has com-
menced.'5 3 Thus, the balance struck by the conflict rules, predicated
on the generalization that there will be no preexisting attorney-client
relationship with respect to the matter in litigation, is likely to be
inappropriate. 154
Second, the conflict rules are premised on the expectation that they
will be applied by lawyers to their own conduct, not by judges to the
conduct of others. It seems appropriate that the rules, as interpreted,
should be both as categorical as possible and extremely protective,
since they will be applied by individuals whose financial self-interest
or other self-interests are likely to weigh in favor of accepting the rep-
resentation. Self-interest can distort the lawyer's assessment in a vari-
ety of ways. It can influence the lawyer to discount the likelihood of
events that would give rise to a conflict or to minimize the likelihood
that the lawyer's representation will thereby be affected. Or, self-in-
terest may affect how the lawyer advises the client about the wisdom
of giving consent to, or "waiving," the conflict. As the Supreme Court
noted in its leading decision on lawyer disqualification, "the willing-
151. See Bruce A. Green, Through a Glass, Darkly: How the Court Sees Motions to
Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 Colum. L Rev. 1201, 1255-56 (1989) [here-
inafter Green, Through a Glass, Darkly].
152. The conflict provisions of the Model Code and Model Rules are explicitly in-
tended to apply both pre- and mid-representation. See Model Code, supra note 2, DR
5-105(B) ("A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment.. . ."); Model Rules,
supra note 1, Rule 1.7 cmt. 2 ("If such a conflict arises after representation has been
undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation.").
153. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
154. Professor Lindgren deserves credit for making this point in response to the
argument that the conflict-of-interest standards applied in disciplinary and disqualifi-
cation proceedings are prophylactic standards "requir[ing a] similar determination of
costs and benefits." Lindgren, supra note 40, at 430-31 (quoting Note, Developments
in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 Harv. L Rev. 1244, 1470-
71 (1981)). Professor Lindgren concurred in the conception of the conflict rules as
prophylactic rules that strike a balance between the costs and benefits of undertaking
the particular representation in the face of a conflict of interest. He argued, however,
that these rules are unduly restrictive in the disqualification setting, because they do
not account for unrecoverable work done by the lawyer by the time a disqualification
motion is filed. Thus, when the court rules on a disqualification motion, the balance
may tip in favor of preserving an attorney-client relationship that should not have
been established at the outset. ld. at 431-32.
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ness of an attorney to obtain such waivers from his clients may bear an
inverse relation to the care with which he conveys all the necessary
information to them. ' 15   On the other hand, when the decision is
made by a disinterested judge, there is less need for a categorical and
highly protective rule as a counterweight to distortions in the decision
making process.
Thus, it would not derogate the judgments underlying the conflict
rules for courts to apply a less restrictive and more flexible standard in
the disqualification context than in the disciplinary context. Nor
would doing so derogate the rules themselves. There is nothing
anomolous about rendering decisions about lawyer conduct based on
a standard different from the disciplinary rules, 56 and the professional
codes specifically contemplate this possibility. 57 Indeed, courts do so
whenever they rule on a criminal defendant's post-conviction claim
that his lawyer's representation was compromised by a conflict of in-
terest.158 Uncoupling the disciplinary rules, which lawyers apply to
155. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988). For commentary on the
decision, see Green, Through a Glass, Darkly, supra note 151; William J. Stuntz,
Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va. L. Rev. 761, 797-801 (1989).
156. Courts often enforce lawyers' fee-sharing agreements that violated the rules of
professional conduct. For example, in New York, DR 2-107 permits a division of fees
between lawyers only if "the division is made in proportion to the services performed
and responsibility assumed by each" or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for
the representation, but the judicial standard governing enforceability of fee sharing
agreements is different from, and more permissive than, the disciplinary standard. As
long as both lawyers in the joint representation have some responsibility for the rep-
resentation or both lawyers have done some work, the agreement will ordinarily be
enforced without consideration of whether the allocation between the lawyers accu-
rately reflects the relative amount of work performed. The agreement will be deemed
void as against public policy only if it is a pure referral fee agreement in which, in
exchange for the referral, one attorney agrees to split fees with another lawyer who
renders no services whatsoever to the client. See, e.g., Oberman v. Reilly, 66 A.D.2d
686, 687 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (holding that an agreement dividing legal fees was
valid provided the attorneys seeking shares contributed services); Wojcik v. Miller
Bakeries Corp., 142 N.E.2d 409, 412 (N.Y. 1957) (stating that a dispute between attor-
neys is not grounds to void a contract if both attorneys have performed services for
their clients); cf N.Y. St. B.A. Committee on Prof. Ethics, Opinion 414 (1975) (noting
that a lawyer has an ethical duty to revise the original fee-sharing agreement if it turns
out to be disproportionate to work performed). One possible reason is that courts do
not want to be drawn into disagreements about precisely how much work the co-
counsel performed. A second is the policy generally favoring the sanctity of contract,
particularly between equally sophisticated parties, such as attorneys. A third is that
the lawyer seeking to void the agreement, having voluntarily entered into it, lacks
"clean hands." See, e.g., Carter v. Katz, Shandell, Katz & Erasmous, 465 N.Y.S.2d 991,
997 (Sup. Ct. 1983) ("Whatever minor transgressions one might perceive, this court
cannot condone this defendant's use of the Code's provisions as a shield to avoid its
legal, ethical and moral obligations.").
157. See, e.g., Model Rules, supra note 1, Preamble (stating that rules are not in-
tended to have extra-disciplinary consequences).
158. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
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their own conduct, from the law applied by courts to disqualification
decisions will benefit the development of both sets of standards.1 59
Applying a more narrowly tailored standard to the question of
whether disqualification is necessary as a remedy, a court in a case like
Levin almost certainly should allow Carpenter, Bennett to continue
the representation. While it was possible that the firm's labor lawyers
would serve IBM less vigorously because the firm's litigators repre-
sented IBM's adversary in the antitrust action, 1 0 this does not seem
particularly likely in practice. The firm could reasonably have con-
cluded that it would represent IBM in precisely the same way and
therefore agreed to represent Levin Computer Corp. if IBM had been
willing to consent at the very start. Apparently, nothing occurred in
the intervening five years when the law firm represented both IBM
and Levin Computer Corp. to suggest that the law firm had performed
inadequately.
The greater likelihood is that the attorney-client relationship with
IBM would have been harmed by the firm's continued representation
of its adversary because IBM would perceive that representation as an
act of disloyalty.' 6' Weighing against this, however, is the fact that
IBM is a large corporation, not an individual, and that the IBM offi-
cials with whom the law firm was dealing in connection with the labor
matters were apparently not concerned with the antitrust action. 62
Even assuming the possibility that IBM's relationship with Carpen-
ter, Bennett might be irreparably harmed, one must consider the ex-
tent to which disqualifying the firm would avert that harm. Insofar as
the attorney-client relationship has been strained by the firm's ongo-
ing involvement in the antitrust action, there is a question whether
disqualification would improve it. Finally, one must consider the ex-
tent to which disqualification would cause harms to others far greater
than any harm it would avert. At most, disqualifying the firm would
avoid the expenses that IBM would incur if, unable to have its law
firm continue representing its adversary, it were otherwise compelled
to obtain new counsel to represent it in an ongoing labor matter. That
might entail some delay and some additional expense because the new
firm would have to repeat work for which Carpenter, Bennett had
already been compensated. It is hard to imagine, however, that this
159. Courts are likely to interpret the rules of conduct more appropriately if they
allow a lawyer to continue the representation despite an impermissible conflict of
interest in cases in which disqualification is not necessary as a remedy. If the discipli-
nary and disqualification standards were precisely the same, courts interpreting the
professional rules in the disqualification context would be influenced to adopt inter-
pretations that were too permissive, as viewed ex ante, in order to avoid unnecessarily
depriving a litigant of chosen counseL See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
160. See IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978).
161. See id.
162. This is precisely why it took IBM five years to discover that its own law firm
was representing its adversary in litigation.
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would be anything approaching the cost to Levin Computer Corp. of
having to obtain new counsel to represent it in an antitrust action that
had been ongoing for five years.
2. The Inadequacy of Alternative Rules
As discussed above, courts employing disqualification exclusively as
a remedy should not rely on the conflict rules, which were designed to
be "overbroad" because they apply before a representation is under-
taken and are self-enforced. The question then, is how courts should
develop the law applicable to this mid-representation judicial deci-
sion-by announcing and applying an alternative set of determinate
rules or by applying a single, open-textured standard on an ad hoc,
case-by-case basis.' 63
One possibility would be for courts to develop categorical-albeit,
less restrictive-rules, as an alternative to those developed by the
ABA. For example, to resolve cases such as Levin, a court might
adopt a rule permitting a lawyer to continue representing one client in
litigation against another client who is represented in connection with
an unrelated business transaction. Such a rule would reflect two ir-
rebuttable presumptions. The first is that the litigation will not pose a
significant risk that the transactional client's confidences will be mis-
used. The second is that even if representing the litigating client will
irreconcilably destroy the lawyer's relationship with the transactional
client, the transactional client is the one who would be harmed less by
the loss of counsel.
Another rule might be developed for the familiar situation in which
a lawyer who had previously represented two clients jointly-e.g., two
business partners or two related corporate entities-subsequently
agrees to represent one in litigation against the other. Many authori-
ties take the view that participating in the litigation in such a case is
improper, not so much because of the risk of misusing the former cli-
ent's confidences (because presumably there were no confidences be-
tween the co-clients), but because the former client would rightly feel
betrayed by a lawyer who represented its adversary in connection with
litigation involving the very subject matter of the former representa-
tion."6 In such a situation, a court might rule that undertaking the
representation is indeed improper and sanction the lawyer accord-
163. On the utility of rules versus standards, see Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of
Rules, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14 (1967); Lawrence Friedman, Laws, Rules, and the Inter-
pretation of Written Documents, 59 Nw. U. L. Rev. 751 (1965); Lon L. Fuller, Consid-
eration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799 (1941); Roscoe Pound, The Theory of
Judicial Decision, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 940 (1923); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 24, 57-59 (1992).
164. See, e.g., Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("A client would feel wronged if an opponent prevailed against him with
the aid of an attorney who formerly represented the client in the same matter."). But
see Christensen v. United States Dist. Court, 844 F.2d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) (al-
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ingly. The court may conclude, however, that a lawyer may continue
representation because the burden on the litigating party from the loss
of counsel will invariably be more serious than the former client's dis-
comfort at having to face its former lawyer in litigation.
There are at least three benefits to employing categorical rules
rather than an open-textured standard. The first is that rules make the
law more certain. Lawyers and their clients will be able to predict
with greater accuracy whether a disqualification motion will be
granted in a particular case. This is not an especially significant bene-
fit, however, because lawyers deciding whether to represent a client at
the outset would not be entitled to rely on the standard of conduct
applicable in the disqualification context. They would ordinarily be
required to apply the conflict rules. Thus, a body of law that was un-
certain or subject to change would not undermine any legitimate reli-
ance interest. Moreover, as suggested earlier, the greater the
uncertainty, the greater the incentive for the aggrieved client to move
for disqualification-which some might view positively.1
A second benefit is that rules will cut down on the courts' fact-find-
ing and deliberation process. In the disqualification context, however,
the extent of the economy created by rules may not be very great.
Much of the court's work would be taken up with the question of
whether the lawyer undertook an impermissible representation and, if
so, whether a particular rule governing the court's disqualification de-
cision applies. The additional work required by an ad hoc standard,
rather than a categorical rule, would be merely incremental. For ex-
ample, in the Levin case, the court could not avoid a fact-finding con-
cerning whether Carpenter, Bennett represented IBM in labor
matters, whether the labor matters were related to the antitrust litiga-
tion, and whether IBM had given informed consent to the firm's rep-
resentation of Levin Computer Corp. Not much additional work
would be required to determine whether IBM had been harmed or
would likely be harmed in the future by the firm's participation in the
antitrust action.
A third benefit of categorical rules is that courts could look to other
institutions, as they have done over the past quarter-century, for help
in developing the applicable rules of conduct. With respect to the
rules applicable to disqualification decisions, the ABA might not be
an appropriate body to aid the courts as the ABA has designed its
rules to govern decision-making by lawyers, not judges. The ALI,
however, might be an appropriate institution to assume this task, if it
were to endorse the concept of disqualification decisions as remedial
only. In that event, the ALI might propose provisions specifically di-
rected at the court's disqualification decision, as distinguished from
lowing representation where former client had "no reason to believe that information
given to counsel [would] not be disclosed to the firm's current client").
165. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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provisions-like those of the ABA Model Rules-directed at the law-
yer's decision. The existing draft Restatement provisions dealing with
conflicts of interest would not suffice, however, because of the appar-
ent assumption that they are meant to apply both to lawyers in mak-
ing their own decisions about whether to take on representation and
to a court's disqualification decision. 166 Of course, one might question
the need for the ALI's help in setting the standard applicable to the
court's disqualification decision. After all, as the Fifth Circuit stated
regarding enforcing conflict rules in American Airlines, "it is our busi-
ness-our responsibility,"' 67 and the same might equally be said about
making ethics law.' 68 Certainly, at this point, the draft Restatement
would serve a more useful function if it were to explore and provide
guidance on the fundamental question of the appropriate relationship
between rules of conduct and disqualification.
Regardless of the possible benefits of categorical rules, they are not
the appropriate solution. To return to one of Wilkins's points, that is
because questions of professional regulation are highly contextual.
Rules would undermine the principal benefit of a judicial decision,
namely, the opportunity to make a judgment that is closely tailored to
the relevant facts and procedural circumstances.
One important contextual factor is timing. As the representation
progresses, a court will be increasingly well situated to assess the like-
lihood that the harms the conflict rules protect against will occur. Ad-
ditionally, as both the client's investment in the lawyer and the judicial
investment of resources increases, it becomes reasonable to accept an
increasingly greater risk that harm will occur as well as to accept the
actual imposition of some harms, particularly intangible ones, to the
moving party.' 69 On the other hand, if a disqualification motion fol-
166. Section 201, which expresses the basic prohibition of conflicts of interest, is
framed as a rule of conduct. See Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 201
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) ("Unless all affected clients and other necessary
persons consent... a lawyer may not represent a client if the representation would
involve a conflict of interest."). Subsequent provisions, which elaborate on the basic
prohibition, are similarly worded.
167. In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 1992).
168. See generally Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 18 (pro-
posing that federal courts employ a rule-making process to develop and promulgate
rules of professional conduct to govern litigators in federal-court proceedings).
169. Criminal case law interpreting the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel reflects this insight. Courts are far more likely to remedy conflicts prior to
trial than after trial. Prior to trial, courts have broad discretion to disqualify criminal
defense lawyers with potential conflicts of interest. This reflects both the difficulty of
predicting whether the quality of representation will in fact be impaired as the repre-
sentation progresses as a consequence of a lawyer's conflict, and recognition that the
cost of disqualifying a lawyer at an early stage of the proceeding is modest, particu-
larly compared with the cost of later overturning a conviction to remedy a conflict of
interest. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162-63 (1988). Post-conviction, a
defendant is entitled to a new trial based on the lawyer's conflict of interest only if the
defendant can show that the lawyer had an actual conflict that adversely affected the
representation. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). This standard in part
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lows hard on the heels of the lawyer's retention, it may be appropriate
to apply the conflict rules, even if the interests they protect do not
seem particularly weighty.170
An equally important set of factors are the nature of the client, the
nature of the various present or past representations, and the relation-
ship between the lawyer and client.17 1 The court's analysis should be
more nuanced than the analysis called for by the conflict rules. The
conflict rules do not account for the possibility that in a given case the
particular lawyer may be especially valuable, that the client may be
especially sophisticated, or that for other reasons it is appropriate for
the client to assume a greater than ordinary risk that the conflict will
impair the quality of the lawyer's representation. Courts can and
should account for these possibilities. On the other hand, courts need
to account particularly for the interests of the moving party that par-
ticularly warrant disqualification. For example, if the transactional cli-
ent in Levin was not IBM, but an individual or small enterprise, the
need for disqualification would be more compelling. Disqualification
would also be more appropriate if it were extremely prejudicial to
substitute a new lawyer in the ongoing transactional matter, either be-
cause the lawyer had developed substantial knowledge over the long
course of the representation or because there would be great harm if
the transaction were delayed.
A third factor, highlighted in cases where one lawyer's conflict of
interest is imputed to other lawyers in a firm, is the possibility of re-
ducing the risks inherent in the conflict by "screening" the lawyer
faced with the conflict or by other procedural means. State rules of
professional conduct take differing approaches to the question of
whether, by instituting procedural safeguards at the outset of the rep-
resentation, a law firm can avoid vicarious disqualification. For exam-
ple, when one member of a law firm formerly represented the
prospective client's adversary in a matter related to the subject of the
prospective litigation, several states allow the law firm to undertake
the representation provided it screens the lawyer at the outset of the
reflects confidence that, once the representation unfolds, a court is in a better position
to ascertain whether and how a conflict affected a lawyer's performance, as well as
recognition that overturning a conviction has considerable costs to the courts and the
public.
170. See, e.g., Burkes v. Hales, 478 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (involving a
motion for disqualification, filed immediately after the lawyer was appointed, based
on the lawyer's former representation of partners of predecessor firm that repre-
sented him).
171. See Crystal, supra note 42, at 293-96 (noting that the extent to which repre-
senting one client against another may undermine the lawyer's zealousness in repre-
senting the client in litigation or may cause disharmony in the lawyer's relationship
with the non-litigation client will vary depending on such factors as the importance of
the respective clients to the law firm, whether the clients are individuals or corpora-




representation and complies with other procedural requirements.17 2
These procedures are designed to ensure that the lawyer does not dis-
close the former client's confidences or otherwise assist members of
the firm involved in the new representation.173
There are various reasons why courts might adopt rules of conduct
that do not contemplate screening. They may make a judgment that
screening is inappropriate in most cases and that, as a matter of clear
line-drawing, it should be forbidden categorically. Or, they may con-
clude that the determination of whether screening is appropriate in a
particular case is highly contextual and therefore particularly subject
to the biases created by lawyer self-interest. Or, they may conclude
that given the modest weight assigned to a prospective client's interest
in counsel of choice, a categorical rule is adequately justified by the
countervailing interest in protecting the former client from a percep-
tion of betrayal.174 Yet, consistent with these underlying judgments, a
court might conclude that screening is an appropriate alternative to
disqualification in individual cases. Thus, in a case in which a firm
violated the applicable conflict rules, either because the firm was cate-
gorically forbidden from undertaking the representation 175 or because
the firm failed to comply with the relevant procedural require-
ments, 76 a court would determine whether confidences had been dis-
172. See ABA/BNA Law. Manual on Prof. Conduct 51:2003 (1993) (indicating that
Illinois, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington have incorporated screen-
ing provisions into their rules on imputed disqualification).
173. On the efficacy of screening to avoid law firm disqualification, see Martin Lip-
ton & Robert B. Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securi-
ties Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 459 (1975); Thomas D. Morgan, Screening the
Disqualified Lawyer: The Wrong Solution to the Wrong Problem, 10 U. Ark. Little
Rock LJ. 37 (1987-88); M. Peter Moser, Chinese Walls: A Means of Avoiding Law
Firm Disqualification When a Personally Disqualified Lawyer Joins the Firm, 3 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 399 (1990); Craig A. Peterson, Rebuttable Presumptions and Intra-Firm
Screenings: The New Seventh Circuit Approach to Vicarious Disqualification of Litiga-
tion Counsel, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 399 (1984); Comment, The Chinese Wall De-
fense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 677 (1980).
174. Cf Cardinale v. Golinello, 372 N.E.2d 26, 30 (N.Y. 1977) ("Irrespective of any
actual detriment, the first client is entitled to freedom from apprehension and to cer-
tainty that his interests will not be prejudiced in consequence of representation of the
opposing litigant by the client's former attorney.").
175. See, e.g., In re Del-Val Fm. Corp. Sec. Litig., 158 F.R.D. 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (permitting screening devices when the attorney was only peripherally involved
in the representation).
176. One recent example where disqualification may have been unnecessary as a
remedy for a conceded violation of the screening requirement is Cobb Publishing, Inc.
v. Hearst Corp., 891 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Mich. 1995). In Cobb, the rule of imputed
disqualification, although allowing screening of a lawyer who switches firms if the
screen is put in place at the outset of the representation, was violated because the firm
waited 11 days to set up the screen and 16 days to notify the court. Id. at 395. Assum-
ing that the "tainted" lawyer had not discussed the case with others in the firm or
allowed them access to confidential material during the intervening period, disqualifi-
cation might be unnecessary.
Another example is Decora Inc. v. DW Wallcovering, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 132
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). In that case, the lawyer who switched firms had worked on the other
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closed by the conflicted lawyer and, if not, whether procedures could
be put in place to prevent future disclosures. Relevant considerations
would include the amount of relevant confidential information pos-
sessed by the disqualified lawyer, the size of the law office,"7 and the
extent of financial or other incentives to breach confidentiality. 17
Where screening could be expected to prevent all harms other than
intangible ones, such as the perception of disloyalty, it might be ap-
propriate to let the representation continue subject to procedural safe-
guards, while sanctioning the law firm or its individual lawyers
directly.17
9
A fourth set of relevant factors are policy concerns applicable to the
particular legal or procedural setting. For example, in criminal cases,
a court might take into account the public interest in avoiding unjust
convictions and the defendant's countervailing constitutionally pro-
tected, albeit qualified, interest in counsel of choice. Particular policy
considerations not ordinarily taken into account by the conflict rules
might be equally relevant in the class action contextlm and in other
procedurally complex settings.
Thus, categorical rules that might be appropriate to govern a law-
yer's decision whether to undertake the representation of a client
would not be appropriate to govern a court's decision whether to dis-
qualify a lawyer from continuing the representation. An example is
the rule underlying Levin-that out of loyalty to the client, a lawyer
may not advocate against a client whom the lawyer represents in an
unrelated matter. Although some commentators have questioned this
rule, most authorities endorse it.' 8 ' It seems entirely reasonable to
apply this rule categorically to the lawyer's decision at the outset of
the representation, yet unreasonable to apply it in Levin to the court's
decision five years after the representation has commenced. Similarly,
side of the case for less than two hours at the previous firm. The district court deter-
mined that screening of the lawyer came too late, id. at 139-40, even though the law-
yer said he remembered nothing from the previous representation and, thus, had
imparted nothing. Id. at 134-35. Had the court credited the lawyer, disqualification
would have been unnecessary.
177. See, eg., Solow v. W.R. Grace & Co., 632 N.E.2d 437 (N.Y. 1994) (holding that
a large and departmentalized law firm was not per se disqualified from representing
the plaintiff in a suit against a former client).
178. Courts make distinctions, for example, between for-profit law offices and gov-
ernment or other not-for-profit law offices. See, eg., State ex rel. Romley v. Superior
Court, 908 P.2d 37, 42 (Ariz. CL App. 1995) (advocating a less restrictive standard for
vicarious disqualification for government prosecutors office); People v. Christian, 48
Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 875 (Cal. CL App. 1996) (finding "ethical walls" adequate to pre-
vent vicarious disqualification of public sector law office and permitting continued
representation).
179. On the efficacy of sanctions against law firms, rather than individual lawyers,
see Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 Cornell L Rev. 1
(1991).
180. See infra note 202.
181. See supra note 136.
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one might accept the prevailing view that "screening" is generally not
an acceptable way of avoiding imputation of a lawyer's conflict of in-
terest to the entire law firm. Nonetheless, courts deciding disqualifi-
cation motions should find that screening is an appropriate alternative
to disqualification in individual cases.
Given the factually intensive nature of the court's determination, it
seems unlikely that categorical rules would fit the bill. One can do
little better than an open-textured standard. 182 Courts must consider
in each case on an ad hoc basis: (1) whether the lawyer will face an
irreconcilable conflict in continuing the representation; (2) if so,
whether disqualification would correct or avert harm to the party
seeking disqualification; and (3) if so, whether the need to remedy
such harm is great enough to justify the burdens on the opposing party
and the court that would result from disqualification. The conflict
rules, or alternative rules of conduct announced by the court, may an-
swer the first of the three questions, but not the last two. Published
decisions may give guidance about the relative importance of various
factors in determining whether disqualification is an appropriate rem-
edy. Moreover, as time goes on, published decisions may identify
classes of cases in which disqualification is typically inappropriate
even though the lawyer undertook an impermissible representation.
But in the end, much would still be left to judges' informed discretion.
The result is that two different legal standards would be employed
to address lawyers' conflicts of interest. The first, contained in the
conflict rules, would be employed by lawyers. It would set the stan-
dard of conduct for lawyers in situations in which there was no judicial
intervention. Lawyers violating this standard would be subject to per-
sonal discipline. The second, reflected in judicial opinions, would gov-
ern courts' decisions in ruling on disqualification motions-as
distinguished from motions for the imposition of personal sanctions.
The decisional law would be less restrictive than the conflict rules and
more responsive to factual nuances. 18 3
One might argue that the law governing lawyers is already unduly
fragmented, and that separating the standard of conduct from the dis-
182. See Lindgren, supra note 40, at 458 (suggesting that a "necessarily vague stan-
dard" should govern disqualification decisions).
183. This approach to disqualification might also be appropriate in settings, such as
bankruptcy proceedings, where the lawyer's conduct is governed by statute, rather
than or in addition to disciplinary rules relating to conflicts of interest. Cf. Rome v.
Braunstein, 19 F.3d 54, 57-59 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that although the prophy-
lactic ethical rules governing attorney conduct under the Bankruptcy Code impose
"particularly rigorous conflict-of-interest restraints upon the employment of profes-
sional persons in a bankruptcy case," in special circumstances, the bankruptcy court
could determine, in its discretion, "that any potential impairment of its institutional
integrity, or risk of divided loyalty by counsel, was substantially outweighed by the
benefits to be derived from counsel's continued representation of multiple entities or
the impracticability of disentangling multiple interests 'without unreasonable delay
and expense."').
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qualification standard will simply compound the problem. The reality,
however, is that in many jurisdictions, these standards are already in-
consistent with each other precisely because courts understand on
some level that the conflict rules do not invariably make sense in the
disqualification context. Thus, courts in the Second Circuit look to
whether the lawyer's impermissible conflict will "taint" the proceed-
ing;'14 some courts apply a "standing" doctrinels 5 or employ principles
of laches or estoppel"s to weed out cases in which disqualification
would unfairly burden the client while serving no remedial purpose;
some courts deny disqualification where the conflict arose inadver-
tently;'87 and still others employ procedural devices, such as screens,
as an alternative to disqualifying a law firm for an impermissible con-
flict.s Few if any courts now disqualify lawyers in all cases in which
undertaking the representation violated a conflict rule. Focusing ex-
plicitly on whether disqualification is a necessary remedy will enable
courts to rationalize disqualification doctrine.
Further, the development of separate conduct and disqualification
standards will enable courts to develop law that is better suited to
each of these separate contexts. The danger of the draft Restate-
ment's approach-that a conflict standard should serve both as the
basis of personal discipline and as the basis of disqualification-is that
the standard will not be well suited to both contexts. Sometimes the
standard will be overly restrictive as applied to disqualification deci-
sions. For example, the categorical principle applied in Levin is ex-
pressed in a Restatement provision that without client consent, "a
lawyer in civil litigation may not ... represent one client in asserting
or defending a claim against another client currently represented by
the lawyer, even if the matters are not related."'1 9 One might argue
184. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 53; see also Linda Ann Winslow, Note, Federal Courts and At-
torney Disqualification Motions: A Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest, 62
Wash. L. Rev. 863, 877-78 (1987) (advocating stricter standing requirements).
186. See, e.g., Employers Ins. v. Albert D. Seeno Constr., 692 F. Supp. 1150, 1165
(N.D. Cal. 1988) (considering particularly "whether the motion was delayed for tacti-
cal reasons"); First Nat'l Bank v. St. Charles Nat'l Bank, 504 N.E.2d 1257, 1264 (Iml.
App. Ct. 1987) (stating that "failure to raise this issue in the trial court at an earlier
time effectively waives the right to object to plaintiff's counsel on conflict of interest
grounds."); River West, Inc. v. Nickel, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1297, 1313 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (reversing disqualification order where the delay in making the disqualification
motion was unreasonable and resulted in great prejudice); cf. Hrudka v. Hrudka, 1
CA-CV 93-0155, 1995 Ariz. App. LEXIS 257, at *9 (Nov. 21, 1995) (holding that
disqualification of husband's attorney after over a year of litigation would be an "ex-
cessive penalty").
187. See supra note 42.
188. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; infra note 201 and accompanying
text.
189. Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 209 at 554 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
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that this is appropriate as a standard of conduct but unduly categorical
as a standard governing disqualification decisions.
Other times, the standard will be overly permissive as applied to
lawyer conduct. For example, the Restatement's rule of imputed dis-
qualification would let a law firm undertake representation adverse to
a former client of a lawyer in the firm as long as "there is no reason-
ably apparent risk that confidential information of the former client
will be [mis]used," because (1) confidences possessed by that lawyer
are "unlikely to be significant in the subsequent matter," (2) "ade-
quate" screening measures are in effect, and (3) "timely and adequate
notice of the screening has been provided to ali affected clients."' 190
The Reporter's Note reflects that the proposed screening provision,
like most of the draft Restatement's other conflict of interest provi-
sions, is premised principally on judicial rulings on disqualification
motions. The rule makes sense as a standard to guide judicial deci-
sion-making in the disqualification setting. It affords courts flexibility
to deny disqualification where it is satisfied that a lawyer's conflict of
interest will be harmless or that the small risk of harm is acceptable.
It might, however, reasonably be argued, consistent with both the
Model Code and the Model Rules, that this rule is not sufficiently
protective when applied by lawyers to their own conduct. Self-inter-
ested lawyers cannot be trusted to assess fairly the likely significance
or insignificance of confidential client information possessed by the
personally-prohibited lawyer,191 the adequacy of screening proce-
dures, and, ultimately, whether client confidences are reasonably
likely to be misused. Further, even if the profession were willing to
believe that lawyers could fairly implement this standard on their own,
former clients might not be so sanguine and, consequently, would per-
ceive the adverse representation as an act of betrayal.
C. Beyond Disqualification
Suppose that before agreeing to represent Levin Computer Corp.,
Carpenter, Bennett unsuccessfully sought IBM's informed consent to
the representation. The firm might then seek judicial authorization to
undertake the representation which would otherwise be impermissible
under the conflict rules. The firm might argue that the rule against
suing one current client on behalf of another, even where the two mat-
ters are unrelated, is appropriate in most cases, but not this one.
Among other reasons, the new representation would be adverse to a
current client that is a large corporate entity, IBM. The IBM officers
and employees concerned with the litigation would be different from
190. Id. § 204(2).
191. One procedural barrier is that the "tainted" lawyer may not share the confi-
dential information he possesses with those in the firm who would undertake the rep-
resentation and who are therefore in the best position to assess the significance of the
confidential information.
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those concerned with the labor matters on which the firm represents
it. Thus, the perception of disloyalty and the risk of harm to the attor-
ney-client relationship with IBM would be far less than in an ordinary
case. Further, the cost to the prospective client of forbidding the rep-
resentation would be greater than in an ordinary case because of Car-
penter, Bennett's six-year relationship with Levin.
In cases such as Levin, or in other unique categories of cases, should
a court entertain a motion for a declaratory judgment that a firm may
properly represent a client, notwithstanding conflict rules to the con-
trary? If so, what standard should the court use to decide the motion?
In cases like Levin, courts probably should not entertain such mo-
tions, even though the movant can make a plausible, and perhaps con-
vincing, claim that the conflict rule is unnecessarily restrictive on the
particular facts of the case. Levin fits within a category of cases which
are clearly contemplated by the general rule and as to which the gen-
eral rule presumably leads to the appropriate outcome on the vast
majority of occasions. That the rule may be unduly restrictive in a
small number of cases is an acceptable cost of a prophylactic rule of
professional conduct that is designed to be self-enforcing. The alter-
native would be to invite judicial review whenever a law firm or its
client has a plausible argument that the conflict rules are an imperfect
fit. The benefits to the occasional client whose argument would pre-
vail would not justify the considerable institutional burden on courts
of having to make decisions that would otherwise be made by lawyers.
Moreover, routine judicial involvement might appear to be an unwar-
ranted intrusion into the conduct of attorney-client relations.
The justifications for an independent judicial determination are not
nearly as compelling at the outset of representation as they are in the
context of disqualification motions. Once a disqualification motion is
made, the court has no choice but to determine whether disqualifica-
tion is a necessary remedy. Deciding this on the basis of a judicial
standard is only marginally more work than deciding it on the basis of
a conflict rule. That extra labor is warranted mid-representation when
disqualification motions are addressed, because the conflict rules do
not adequately account for the client's interest in retaining the contin-
ued services of the lawyer who has begun representation in litigation.
Thus, the rules would often lead to the wrong result if applied in dis-
qualification cases.
When an unforeseen conflict arises at a midpoint in the representa-
tion, however, it is appropriate for courts to make themselves avail-
able to determine the propriety of a lawyer's representation at the
behest of the party that would otherise lose its lawyer's services. In
the course of litigation, unforeseen conflicts occasionally arise that im-
plicate the interests of other former or present clients. In criminal
cases, this typically occurs because of the prosecution's decision to call
1996]
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the defense lawyer's client as a witness.' In civil cases, this typically
occurs because of the movement of lawyers between firms, and, in
recent years, has also occurred with increasing frequency because of
law firm mergers' 93 and the mergers of corporate clients. 94 Conflicts
arising out of a lawyer's own interest may also occur unexpectedly
mid-representation when the litigation proceeds along unexpected
lines. 95
In this category of cases, the benefit of judicial review would seem
to justify the attendant judicial burden. The conflict rules are unduly
restrictive mid-representation. The same considerations that justify
applying a less restrictive standard to disqualification decisions should
justify reviewing the propriety of the representation under the ad hoc
judicial standard when asked to do so by a party that would otherwise
lose its lawyer in the middle of litigation by operation of the conflict
rules. Further, insofar as the conflict was unforeseeable, a judicial
192. See, e.g., United States v. lorizzo, 786 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding inef-
fective assistance of counsel because of conflict of interest arising when attorney's
former client was the government's key witness against the current client); United
States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1264-65 (7th Cir. 1975) (discussing the possibility of a
conflict of interest arising when an attorney's former client is called as an adverse
witness), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976); see also Gary T. Lowenthal, Successive
Representation by Criminal Lawyers, 93 Yale L.J. 1, 1-22 (1983) (providing data from
an empirical study on the frequency with which criminal defense attorneys must face
former clients as adverse witnesses and discussing several ethical considerations in
such cases).
193. See, e.g., Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1127
(N.D. Ohio 1990) (explaining that disqualification is appropriate when a conflict of
interest arises from a merger between law firms).
194. See, e.g., In re Wingspread Corp., 152 B.R. 861, 864 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(pointing out that, through no fault of a law firm, previously unrelated representa-
tions can raise a possible conflict of interest because of a merger between two compa-
nies); Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264, 273 (D.Del. 1980) (suggesting, in
dicta, that law firms inform both clients in writing as soon as the firm learns of a
potential conflict of interest caused by a change in the internal operations of the
clients).
195. For instance, a lawyer who represents the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action
may be the subject of the defendant's third-party action for contribution. See, e.g.,
Costin v. Wick, 95 CA 006133, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 233, at *7 (Jan. 24, 1996)
(involving plaintiffs' malpractice attorney who was forced to withdraw after being
joined as a third party defendant). This possibility raises a conflict between the plain-
tiff's interest in prevailing in the malpractice action and the lawyer's interest in avoid-
ing liability. The conflict exists even if plaintiff's counsel is convinced that a
threatened action against it would be utterly meritless. See, e.g., Schenck v. Hill, Lent
& Troescher, 130 A.D.2d 734, 734 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (affirming the decision to
disqualify plaintiffs counsel who was impleaded as a third-party defendant). More-
over, this may be a conflict to which consent ordinarily would be unavailable under
the conflict rules. In criminal cases, the defense lawyer's personal interests may unex-
pectedly be implicated if the lawyer is accused of participating in the defendant's al-
leged crime or subjected to unrelated accusations that might lead the lawyer to
advocate less vigorously to curry favor with the prosecution. See, e.g., Mannhalt v.
Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a conflict exists when an attor-
ney is accused of crimes related to those of his client, because of the great potential
for diminished effectiveness in representation).
[Vol. 65
CONFLICTS: THE JUDICIAL ROLE
declaration that the representation may be undertaken should fore-
close discipline based on an otherwise applicable conflict rule.
A recent federal case illustrates the utility of an ad hoc judicial de-
termination concerning the propriety of ongoing representation in
light of an unanticipated conflict. The conflict arose when the plain-
tiff's law firm agreed to employ a lawyer who, more than a year ear-
lier, served as an associate of the defendant's law firm and performed
approximately 800 hours of work for the defendant. Before the law-
yer commenced the new employment, the plaintiffs law firm offered
to institute screening procedures designed to allow it to remain in the
representation. The jurisdiction's conflict rules would not have per-
mitted screening as an alternative to disqualifying the entire law firm.
Nonetheless, over the defendant's opposition, the court authorized
the law firm to continue the representation subject to the proposed
screening and additional procedural protections.1 96 As the court ap-
parently recognized, undertaking this determination was justified
given the considerable cost to the client of losing its lawyer in the
course of ongoing litigation.197
Even at the outset of the representation, courts should be willing to
issue declaratory judgments in some categories of cases to protect cli-
ents from the hardship of overly restrictive rules. An example might
be where the client lacks capacity to consent to a representation that
ordinarily could not be undertaken without client consent. In this cat-
egory of cases, the conflict rules are overly restrictive because they are
based on a paradigm of a client who is capable of consenting to the
conflict. In cases in which a client with capacity would almost invaria-
bly consent, forbidding the representation of someone who is incapa-
ble of consenting may do more harm than good.
An illustration, suggested by Professor Geoffrey Hazard's testi-
mony as an expert in a recent case, is where a parent and minor child
injured in an automobile accident sue the same defendant.1 98
196. Bank Brussels Lambert v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 93 Civ. 5298,
1996 WL 346009 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1996).
197. The same rationale should apply when a conflict of interest that should have
been apparent at the outset is identified only after the representation has commenced
and withdrawal would be costly to the client. See Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers xxv (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). Suppose, for example, that five
years after the representation commenced, the conflict in Levin was identified by Car-
penter, Bennett, rather than IBM, and instead of concealing the problem, the firm
unsuccessfully requested IBM's consent at that late date. If the firm, rather than
awaiting a disqualification motion, itself sought a declaratory judgment permitting the
ongoing representation, it would have been appropriate for the district court to con-
sider the motion and to do so under the same standard as it would have reviewed
IBM's disqualification motion. The willingness to consider such requests, even when
the conflict of interest was far from inadvertent, would not encourage lawyers to ig-
nore the conflict rules as long as the court also directly sanctioned the lawyers. The
lawyers' disclosure might mitigate the sanction, but not excuse the wrongdoing.
198. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When
the Rules Meet the Road, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1159, 1194 & n.148 (1995).
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Although the lawyer might not doubt the ability to represent both
family members adequately, an ordinary application of the conflict
rules would probably condition the representation on the clients' will-
ingness to give informed consent because of the possibility that the
lawyer in settlement negotiations might minimize the settlement for
one client in order to maximize the settlement for the other.199 The
conventional wisdom, however, is that child clients cannot give effec-
tive consent.200 This would certainly be true if the child were non-
verbal or quite young. Thus, lawyers must either undertake the repre-
sentation contrary to the language, if not the intent, of the conflict
rules, or decline the representation and force the family to incur the
otherwise unnecessary expense of retaining two different lawyers. In
this scenario, the preferable course might be to allow the lawyer to
seek a judicial determination about the propriety of the
representation.20 '
Finally, there may be particular legal settings in which courts should
be receptive to determining, under a common law standard, whether
to permit a representation that would otherwise be improper under
the conflict rules. In class actions, for example, undertaking this de-
termination is only an incremental burden, as courts are nevertheless
199. For an argument that conflict rules should apply differently in cases involving
family members, see Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing
Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1253 (1994).
200. For discussions of conflicts of interest in representing child clients, see Nancy
J. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Representation of Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev.
1819 (1996); Christopher N. Wu, Conflicts of Interest in the Representation of Children
in Dependency Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1857 (1996).
201. At the recent Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children, participants addressed this problem without agreeing on a satisfactory reso-
lution. A group of participants who focused on conflicts of interest in the legal repre-
sentation of children proposed that judicial authorization be allowed to substitute for
consent of the child client. The Conference ultimately recommended, however, that
further study be given to this question. See Recommendations of the Conference on
Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1301, 1319-
20 (1996); Report of the Working Group on Conflicts of Interest, 64 Fordham L. Rev.
1379, 1385-86 (1996).
At present, there would be little incentive for the lawyer to seek judicial approval
before accepting the representation where the conflict rules ordinarily require con-
sent but the client is incapable of providing it. In this context, there is little danger of
disqualification or a personal sanction for what might be considered a violation of the
applicable rules. In cases in which courts have reason to know that there may be an
impermissible representation-for example, where a lawyer enters an appearance on
behalf of co-clients, one of whom is a child-the court itself may initiate an inquiry
and, if it finds a violation, impose a sanction. Thus, the willingness of courts to be-
come "proactive" in civil cases, as they presently are to some degree in criminal cases,
see, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c) (requiring judicial inquiry where criminal defendants
are jointly represented), may encourage lawyers to seek judicial guidance at the out-
set of a proposed representation where it is appropriate to do so. In contexts, how-
ever, where a possible conflict would not be reasonably apparent to the court, less
scrupulous lawyers would have little incentive to seek judicial review until such time
as disciplinary agencies became stricter in enforcing the relevant conflict provisions.
[Vol. 65
1996] CONFLICTS: THE JUDICIAL ROLE 127
obliged to determine the adequacy of class counsel. 0 2 Moreover, the
conflict rules do not appear to be drafted with class action procedures
in mind and may be at odds with the policies underlying the class ac-
tion rules.2"3 Finally, class action procedure affords safeguards, such
as judicial review of the fairness of a settlement,204 that may reduce
the risk of harm from class counsel's conflict of interest.20s Thus, it
may be appropriate for courts, in response to the exigencies of class
202. In class action litigation, the question of whether an attorney is barred by a
conflict of interest from engaging in a particular representation may arise in various
contexts, including at the certification stage, when the court determines the adequacy
of class counsel See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); see, e.g., Tedesco v. Mishkin, 689 F. Supp.
1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that in a class action certification motion, attorney rep-
resenting plaintiff class had to withdraw from representing individual co-trustee be-
cause of conflict); Jackshaw Pontiac, Inc., v. Cleveland Press Publishing Co., 102
F.R.D. 183 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (holding that attorneys could not adequately represent
plaintiff class because of simultaneous representation of different plaintiff in action
against same defendant). The issue may also arise in the context of proceedings con-
cerning the fairness of a settlement. See, eg., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1213-
14 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that a settlement providing for attorney's fees payable out
of a settlement fund does not create a conflict of interest); Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that settlement and attorney's
fees were fair and reasonable, and that concurrent representation of clients with simi-
lar claims to class was not a conflict), vacated and remanded, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.
1996); Holden v. Burlington N., Inc., 665 F. Supp. 1398, 1426-28 (D. Minn. 1987) (al-
lowing attorneys to concurrently negotiate settlement and attorneys' fees).
203. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1986); In
re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 162-66 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J.,
concurring); 3 Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 15.01
at 15-3 (3d ed. 1992); Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 493 (1986).
Recent articles addressing the settlement of asbestos-related personal injury claims
in Georgine, demonstrate the considerable need for study of class counsel's conflicts
of interest. See Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc., 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1045 (1995); Menkel-Meadow, supra note
198. Professor Koniak's article suggests that in the course of determining the fairness
of a proposed class action settlement-which necessarily requires consideration of the
adequacy of counsel's representation-a district court may be tempted to approve of
representation that would be improper under a seemingly straightforward application
of conflict rules. Koniak, supra at 1078-86. Professor Menkel-Meadow's article sug-
gests that one reason for doing so is the imperfect fit between the class action setting
and conflict rules that contemplate the representation of individual clients and the
possibility of client consent in situations raising a theoretical, but not realistic, possi-
bility that the lawyer's representation will be impaired because of other interests the
lawyer may be tempted to serve. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 198, at 1189-98.
204. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
205. See, e.g., In re Corn Derivatives, 748 F.2d at 165 (Adams, J., concurring) (not-
ing that strict procedural requirements, and particularly fairness hearings, serve as
safeguards for the rights of class action members); Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and
Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 Tex. L Rev. 385, 397 (1987)
("Rule 23(e) protects class members from some potential attorney conflicts of interest
in settlements by mandating judicial approval and notice of any proposed
settlement.").
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representation, to address conflicts of interest under a judicial stan-
dard that is more permissive than the conflict rules.20 6
CONCLUSION
With limited exceptions,20 7 courts have ultimate authority to make
and enforce the law governing litigators' conflicts of interest. They
exercise their lawmaking authority in large measure by adopting con-
flict rules as part of a larger array of rules of professional conduct.
They exercise their enforcement authority in part by disqualifying
lawyers who represent litigants in violation of the conflict rules.
The two judicial roles give rise to warring impulses. As lawmakers,
courts adopt highly restrictive rules for lawyers to apply when decid-
ing whether to take on a new client or a new matter in litigation.
Based on the recognition that lawyers are generally replaceable, if not
fungible, and that new clients have a minimal interest in choosing any
particular lawyer, courts are particularly solicitous of the interests of
past, present, and future clients who might be harmed by a lawyer's
conflict of interest. As one expression of this, the conflict rules gener-
ally privilege the interest in preserving the former or existing client's
confidence in its lawyer's loyalty over the new client's interest in
choice of counsel.
As law-enforcers in the disqualification setting, however, courts
must consider interests of the newly represented litigant that would
have been far less compelling, if present at all, prior to the representa-
tion. Particularly, these include the interest in retaining the services of
a lawyer with whom the litigant has now formed an attorney-client
relationship and who may have already performed considerable work
on the case. The litigant's interest will often outweigh another client's
countervailing interests, particularly if they are exclusively intangible
ones.
The common assumption that the rules governing lawyers' conduct
prior to accepting the representation must be the same as those ap-
plied to the court's decision whether to disqualify the litigator places
206. Cf Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988)
(denying a motion to disqualify former class counsel from representing unnamed class
members in an appellate challenge to the settlement). In Bash, the court stated:
When all is said and done, Williams has represented two sides of the same
case-the defense of the settlement before the district judge, and the attack
on the settlement in this court. But conflicts of interest are built into the
device of the class action, where a single lawyer may be representing a class
consisting of thousands of persons not all of whom will have identical inter-
ests and views. Recognizing that strict application of rules on attorney con-
duct that were designed with simpler litigation in mind might make the class-
action device unworkable in many cases, the courts insist that a serious con-
flict be shown before they will take remedial or disciplinary action.
Id.
207. One exception is in bankruptcy cases, where conflicts of interest are governed
in part by statute. See supra note 183.
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courts in a quandary. Under a restrictive standard that appropriately
applies to the lawyer's conduct at the outset, courts will be compelled
to disqualify lawyers when it is unnecessary to do so to avert harm to
the movant and where doing so will seriously harm the client who is
denied the lawyer's services. Under a permissive standard that is well
tailored to the disqualification decision, however, lawyers will be per-
mitted to undertake representations when there is an unreasonably
high risk that a client's interests will suffer as a consequence.
Courts might disqualify lawyers whenever they violate the conflict
rules based on any of several rationales, including that: (1) disqualifi-
cation should be employed to safeguard the integrity of judicial pro-
ceedings whenever a lawyer violates a conflict rule; (2)
disqualification should be employed to sanction lawyers for violating
conflict rules; (3) disqualification should serve as an equitable remedy
for violations of either the conflict rules themselves or the common
law rights underlying them; or (4) in employing disqualification to pre-
vent the harms against which the conflict rules protect, courts should
defer to the judgments underlying the conflict rules as to whether dis-
qualification of counsel is necessary to avert such harm. This Article
analyzes and rejects these rationales. In doing so, it explores various
interconnected considerations relevant to how courts deal with liti-
gators' conflicts. These include the legal significance and the content
of the conflict rules, the importance of a judicial role in enforcing con-
flict rules, the appropriateness of employing disqualification as op-
posed to direct personal sanctions to punish violations of conflict
rules, the use of disqualification as a remedy, and the utility of ad hoc
judicial standards in place of conflict rules.
This Article advances a conception of the judicial role that would
require deciding disqualification motions based on a legal standard
apart from the conflict rules. First, courts should enforce the conflict
rules by imposing personal sanctions on lawyers, rather than disquali-
fying them as a form of sanction. Disqualification should be em-
ployed exclusively as a remedy.
Second, as lawmakers, courts should develop a flexible, fact-inten-
sive legal standard for deciding whether to disqualify a lawyer to rem-
edy a conflict of interest. This standard, to be employed by courts on
an ad hoc basis, should be less restrictive than the conflict rules and
more closely tailored to the relevant harms that might be caused by
the conflict of interest, on the one hand, and disqualification, on the
other. This standard should also be applied in other contexts in which
it is appropriate for a court, at the request of a party, to substitute its
judgment for that underlying the conflict rules. When a court autho-
rizes the representation to commence or continue based on this judi-
cial standard, its decisions should have the legal effect of superseding
more restrictive legal standards contained in the conflict rules or in
1996]
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common law that might otherwise apply to the lawyer's ongoing
representation.
